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INTRODUCTION
Although many scholars agree that contemporary transitional justice
mechanisms' are flawed, a comprehensive and unified alternative ap-
proach to accountability for mass violence has yet to be propounded.2
Like many international lawyers, transitional justice theorists have fo-
cused their assessment efforts on the successes and failures of
established institutions.' This Article argues that before we can measure
1. Scholars have taken different views on the meaning and emphasis of transitional
justice. See, e.g., RUTi G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (defining transitional justice
to include any period of political transition, and describing a limited set of mechanisms of
transitional justice, namely criminal justice through trials, historical justice through truth
commissions and reports, reparatory justice through various forms such as compensation and
tribute, administrative justice through exclusion and lustration, and constitutional justice
through constitutional change); RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN
THE SHADOWS OF WAR 5-6 (2002) (emphasizing that, in order "[t]o restore justice after con-
flict," peacebuilders must address legal justice, rectifying justice, and distributive justice);
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 1, 2 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza
& Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006) (defining transitional justice as "that set of practices,
mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife, or repression,
and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and
humanitarian law"). This Article defines transitional justice as any effort to respond to mass
crimes and rebuild the afflicted society, incorporating the mechanisms described by Teitel and
Roht-Arriaza, accepting Mani's extension of the definition beyond harms directly traceable to
violence, and including new approaches grounded in the local that have yet to be assessed or
even imagined on the international stage.
2. JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 253 (2006) ("[M]ore system-
atic thinking and empirical research on the impact of accountability proceedings in specific
post-conflict societies is a critical need and an increasingly important area of inquiry."); Oskar
N.T. Thoms, James Ron & Roland Paris, Does Transitional Justice Work? Perspectives from
Empirical Social Science 9 (Oct. 19, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1302084
(noting that "policymakers still tend to promote a standardized menu of [transitional justice]
options"). See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
206 (2007) [hereinafter DRUMBL, ATROCITY] (criticizing the use of "modalities of ordinary
liberal criminal law" in current transitional justice regimes); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM
BELOW: GRASSROOTs ACTIVISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna
McGregor eds., 2008) (discussing how traditional transitional justice mechanisms often ignore
the needs of those most affected by the crimes); Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman,
Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COM-
MUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 56 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein
eds., 2004) (concluding that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda's (ICTR) work
following the 1994 Rwanda genocide did little to assist the reconciliation within Rwanda);
Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1
(2002) (explaining the difficulties of balancing punishment of international crimes with the
need to avoid show trials).
3. Cf. Tom Ginsburg & Gregory Shaffer, How Does International Law Work?: What
Empirical Research Shows, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Cane
& Herbert Kritzer eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22), available at ssrn.com/
abstract= 1524385 (noting that empirical studies of whether international law is effective are
"plagued by problems of the counterfactual").
Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice
whether transitional justice is working, we must begin with a theory of
what it is trying to achieve. Once we have a coherent theory, we must
use it ex ante, to design effective transitional justice mechanisms, not
just to assess their effectiveness ex post. Drawing on several scholarly
methods, I posit that effective transitional justice mechanisms are ones
that successfully reconstruct social norms opposing mass violence. Be-
cause norm generation is an inherently communal and contingent social
process, transitional justice ought to be primarily locally controlled and
always precisely tailored to particular events and societies.! In a word, it
must be bespoke. This Article seeks to replace a universalist vision of
transitional justice-imposition of a uniform set of substantive values-
with a pluralist approach to transitional justice-reconciliation of com-
peting value frames through an inclusive process.
Over the past two decades, societies recovering from mass crimes
have pursued transitional justice in dramatically increasing numbers.
From the former Yugoslavia to Timor-Leste, most observers and scholars
have viewed internationalized criminal courts as the gold standard for
responding to these large-scale atrocities.! This assessment relies on a
flawed universalist assumption that accountability mechanisms designed
to address domestic crimes can and should be applied across dramati-
cally varied cultures and contexts.' Because the social norms of the
Western nations in which the relevant criminal standards were incubated
are often strikingly different from those of the societies that transitional
justice seeks to impact, these "universal" mechanisms have often been
unresponsive to the needs of societies recovering from mass violence.
4. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 309 ("The needs and aspirations of the people
who endured ... atrocities must be appreciated more fully, and their goals must be given
greater attention in designing accountability efforts.").
5. See Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 225
(2009) [hereinafter Berman, New Legal Pluralism] (detailing the history of "global legal plu-
ralism"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of
Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 555-56 (2006) (describing "process pluralism").
6. Kathryn Sikkink & Carrie Booth Walling, The Impact of Human Rights Trials in
Latin America, 44 J. PEACE RESOL. 427, 431 fig. 1 (2007) (showing a steep increase in the total
number of transitional justice mechanisms between 1987 and 2004).
7. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001) (discussing the international tribunal
successes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda); Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003) (discussing hybrid domestic-international courts); Lisa J. Laplante,
Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice Schemes, 49 VA. J.
INT'L L. 915, 932-35 (2009) (describing the move away from amnesty and toward interna-
tional criminal justice); Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to the Hague, 149 MIL. L. REv. 107
(1995) (explaining how the ad hoc criminal tribunals improved on the process laid out at Nur-
emberg).
8. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1189-91
(2007) [hereinafter Berman, Global Legal Pluralism].
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Drawing from several disciplines, this Article proposes that successful
norm reconstruction requires that the local population perceive transi-
tional justice institutions as legitimate and the values they propound as
worthy of internalization. Transitional justice mechanisms carefully tai-
lored to the society they serve will be perceived as significantly more
legitimate than institutions drawn from a "universal" mold.
This Article offers the first comprehensive attempt to catalogue the
perceptions and attitudes of local populations toward contemporary tran-
sitional justice mechanisms. It draws on empirical surveys and cultural
studies to demonstrate legitimacy gaps, which have largely been caused
by failures of international criminal courts to incorporate local perspec-
tives and preferences. Other mechanisms have been more successful in
garnering legitimacy, but these locally grounded accountability efforts
have limitations of their own. The central lesson from these case studies
is that the existing catalogue of transitional justice institutions should be
viewed as a spectrum rather than a hierarchy of options.
In other words, rather than assuming that internationalized criminal
courts are the best mechanism for resolving every dispute, the solution
should be carefully tailored to the conflict and the needs and interests of
the parties through an inclusive design process.! While others have pre-
sented similar critiques, few have offered concrete suggestions for
crafting effective transitional justice mechanisms. In contrast, this Article
presents design principles to increase the legitimacy of the source, pro-
cedure, and substance of transitional justice institutions, as well as
evidence-based and locally grounded methods to implement these prin-
ciples. This approach assumes that competing visions of substantive
justice will exist within the affected society and the international com-
munity, and aims to incorporate, or at least respond to, a variety of
perspectives. As a result, the pluralist process design promises to in-
crease institutional legitimacy, which will lead to more successful norm
reconstruction in societies afflicted by mass violence.
The pluralist process approach breaks new ground for the empirical
study of public international law more generally. Rather than focusing on
the question of whether international law is effective,'o the Article takes
9. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends?
A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1613, 1619 (1997) [hereinafter Men-
kel-Meadow, Introduction] (explaining the values of the use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not the Only Way: Consensus-
Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 42
(2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Consensus-Building] (explaining how alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms can be used to contribute to overall procedural fairness in adjudica-
tion).
10. Ginsburg & Shaffer, supra note 3, at 14-20. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Re-
storative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. REv. LAw Soc. Sci. 10.1, 10.12-10.13
4 [Vol. 32:1
Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice
as a starting point the idea that effective legal processes are those that
successfully reconstruct social norms. From that launching pad, a sim-
pler and more productive question can be asked: how can we design
international institutions to maximize their effectiveness? Rather than
assessing after the fact whether international law changes behavior, we
can design international law institutions in such a way that they will be
more likely to alter social norms and thus increase compliance. By rec-
ognizing that public international law often acts on individuals who must
internalize its proffered norms to render it effective, this prescriptive em-
piricism can transcend debates over whether international law matters
and get working on making it matter."
This Article proceeds in five parts. It begins by providing a brief ex-
planation of the problems inherent in applying international criminal law
to all transitional justice situations. The piece then lays out theories of
legitimacy from several disciplines, suggesting that transitional justice
mechanisms that are perceived as legitimate will be more effective in
reconstructing social norms concerning mass violence. The Article next
catalogues the performance of contemporary transitional justice mecha-
nisms, focusing on the perceptions of the populations who suffered the
mass violence that these courts, truth commissions, and other processes
were created to address. This discussion of empirical surveys and cul-
tural studies points to widespread local dissatisfaction with many of
these institutions, which, as a result, may be rejected as illegitimate. The
Article then offers general principles and concrete methods through
which transitional justice mechanisms can be designed to increase their
legitimacy and effectiveness in shifting social norms. Finally, the Article
situates its proposals in current international law and dispute resolution
(2007) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice] (discussing empirical challenges in
the context of restorative justice that are also applicable to transitional justice). Cf. Oona A.
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
11. See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J.
INT'L L. 301, 322-23 (2007) [hereinafter Berman, A Pluralist Approach] ("A pluralist ap-
proach to the global legal system . .. extricates international law scholars from fruitless
debates about whether international law is really law at all .... ); Lisa L. Martin & Beth A.
Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 52 INT'L ORG. 729,
743 (1998) (arguing that research should move beyond whether international law matters).
See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and In-
ternational Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621 (2004) (offering the sociological conceptual
framework of acculturation to assess design principles and political strategies used to increase
international human rights law's influence over state behavior); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273
(1997) (defining effective supranational adjudication as a tribunal's ability to obtain compli-
ance with its judgments, and offering a checklist to assess the effectiveness of supranational
tribunals); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997) (presenting norm internalization as the key to compliance with international law
and offering transnational legal process as the method by which this internalization occurs).
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literature that rejects universalist and adversarial legalist approaches in
favor of process pluralism. It concludes by offering a vision of how
process pluralism might play out in practice, applying this new frame to
two of the case studies presented earlier in the Article.
I. THE DESIGN FLAWS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
International criminal law, though noble in its aspirations, currently
suffers from serious design flaws. Patterned after domestic Anglo-
European criminal law, the rationales behind, and structures of, interna-
tional criminal law are inadequate in addressing the collective nature of
mass violence and bridging the differences between cultural contexts.
Though efforts have been made to accommodate additional goals within
the current framework of international criminal law, piecemeal solutions
risk creating internal contradictions and other structural flaws.12
In its current incarnation, international criminal law's central goals
are retribution and deterrence." While domestic criminal laws might be
able to achieve these goals,14 international criminal law operates in a very
different context. Domestic criminal law focuses on individual perpetra-
tors of crimes that violate social norms established by a stable power
structure. Crimes of mass violence, in contrast, are perpetrated by groups
supported and often encouraged by social norms that have been manipu-
lated by a renegade power structure." As a result, the assumptions
underlying the justifications for domestic criminal law do not hold true
at the international level.'"
12. Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 925 (2008) (identifying internal contradictions of international criminal law). See
also David S. Koller, The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer, 40 N.YU. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1019, 1024-32 (2008), at 1029-32 (finding flaws in the "effects" justification for inter-
national criminal law).
13. See, e.g., Mijan Damaska, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83
CHI-KENT L. REV. 329, 331 (2008) (citing deterrence and retribution as goals of international
criminal law); David S. Koller, supra note 12, at 1024-25; DIANE F. ORENTLICHER & OPEN
Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, SHRINKING THE SPACE FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN
SERBIA 38 (May 2008) (quoting International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) Judge Theodor Meron as saying that "the primary goal of an international tribunal is
to do justice and punish atrocities").
14. Social psychology studies question the effectiveness of deterrence as a method of
ensuring compliance with the law even in the domestic context. See Tom R. Tyler & John M.
Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality and the Legiti-
macy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 707, 712-13 (2000). See also Koller, supra note 12, at 1025-27.
15. Thanks to Diane Marie Amann for helping me to conceptualize this distinction. See
also DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 32.
16. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2
INT'L CRIm. L. REv. 93, 116 (2002) [hereinafter Amann, Group Mentality] (arguing that, part-
6 [Vol. 32:1
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International criminal law does not serve an adequate retributive
function in the context of mass violence, as criminal sentences served for
mass crimes before internationalized criminal courts differ little from
those served for individual crimes.1 In other words, criminal sanctions
are inadequate to address the extraordinary nature of mass atrocities. The
deterrence rationale is also questionable in the context of mass crimes.
Although internationalized criminal courts might be able to perform spe-
cific deterrence in some cases-that is, they might stop a handful of
perpetrators from repeating their actions-they do not have the capacity
to try every individual who committed a crime in a situation of mass vio-
lence." And when it comes to general deterrence, it is extremely difficult
to prove theoretically or empirically that internationalized criminal
courts prevent the commission of grave crimes elsewhere in the world.1
9
Mass violence arises in unique societal and historical circumstances, led
ly because international criminal courts rarely have the enforcement power to arrest defen-
dants, "[i]nternational criminal law seldom has served either retribution or deterrence better
than would a national counterpart"); Diane Marie Amann, The Rights of the Accused in a
Global Enforcement Arena, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555, 558-60 (2000) (identifying
structural and procedural problems of international criminal courts that rarely exist in domes-
tic courts); Mark A. Drumbl, Toward a Criminology of International Crime, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 263, 270-71 (2003) [hereinafter Drumbl, Criminology] (arguing that neither
deterrence nor retribution provide a complete justification for the international criminal justice
system because international criminal prosecutions are selective rather than comprehensive
and because deterrence assumes perpetrator rationality); Koller, supra note 12, at 1024-32
(discussing the failure of the retribution, deterrence, and effects rationales to justify "establish-
ing or relying upon international criminal courts and tribunals"); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do
International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U.
L. REv. 777, 790 (2006) ("[T]here is almost no scholarship attempting to analyze whether, as
an empirical matter, ICTs are likely to have, or actually have had, any deterrence effect on
perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities."); Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors:
Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, INT'L SECURITY, Winter
2003/04, at 5, 13 (discussing issues that must be considered in order to effectively promote
deterrence in the international criminal arena); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of
International Criminal Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 561, 569-83 (2002) (identifying difficulties
unique to the international criminal system in achieving deterrence); David Wippman, Atroci-
ties, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Law, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 473, 474
(1999) ("Unfortunately, the connection between international prosecutions and the actual
deterrence of future atrocities is at best a plausible but largely untested assumption.").
17. Id. at 69; Koller, supra note 12, at 1025-26.
18. Diane Marie Amann, Assessing International Criminal Adjudication of Human
Rights Atrocities, 2000-2003 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 169, 173-74 (2003) [hereinafter
Amann, International Criminal Adjudication]; Tallgren, supra note 16, at 584. The same cri-
tique could be raised for the incapacitation rationale of international criminal law.
19. Snyder and Vinjamuri argue that international criminal law's focus on retroactive
punishment may actually hinder the goal of deterrence, which "requires neutralizing potential
spoilers, strengthening a coalition that supports norms of justice in the society, and improving
the domestic administrative and legal institutions that are needed to implement justice
predictably over the long run." Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 16, at 13. Prosecutions may
antagonize spoilers or members of a potential governing coalition, thus leading to a backlash
that may result in lawlessness and further abuses. Id.
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by psychologically unstable individuals. As a result, those who perpe-
trate it are unlikely to ponder the legal consequences before doing so.20
The counterfactual problem renders empirical proof of the deterrent ef-
fect of international criminal courts nearly impossible.2 1
More recently, scholars have suggested that the expressive function
of international criminal law is a more appropriate justification for its
use in the context of mass violence.22 However, in order for law to suc-
cessfully shape societal meanings of right and wrong, the message
understood, rather than the message intended, is crucial.23 In cross-
cultural settings, there is a significant risk that the message received will
differ significantly from the message intended, particularly given that
many messages will be at play, both among senders and receivers.24 For
legal institutions to successfully perform an expressive function, the
community whose norms are at issue must trust those who aim to alter
these norms, and individuals with authority in the message-receiving
communities must participate in the process of clarifying and establish-
ing new social norms.25 As discussed further below, international
criminal law has not been effective in ensuring that the message intended
matches the message received, perhaps because of the absence of par-
ticipation by members of affected societies. 26
The first two justifications-deterrence and retribution-do not
translate well from the domestic context to situations of mass violence.
While the third justification, the expressive function, does a better job of
20. See Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1254-55 (2000).
21. Ginsburg & Shaffer, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that empirical studies of whether
international law is effective are "plagued by problems of the counterfactual-namely that we
do not know how a world without international law would look").
22. E.g., Amann, International Criminal Adjudication, supra note 18, at 178-80 (dis-
cussing the expressive power of criminal proceedings while acknowledging their limitations);
Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L.
39, 70 (2007); David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy
of International Criminal Law 9-10 (Geo. L. Fac. Working Papers, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1154177. Because punishment establishes an "authoritative schedule
of moral values," criminal law can be used to manage public discourse and establish social
norms. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 421
(1999). See also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2030-31 (1996) (explaining the power of societal norms).
23. Amann, Group Mentality, supra note 16, at 118-20; Sunstein, supra note 22, at
2051.
24. See Amann, Group Mentality, supra note 16, at 117-31; Duncan Ivison, Justifying
Punishment in Intercultural Contexts: Whose Norms? Which Values?, in PUNISHMENT AND
POLITICAL THEORY 88, 100-07 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999); Sloane, supra note 22, at 81-88.
25. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2049 (citing Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" policy as an
example of the failure of norm management).
26. See infra Part m.
8 [Vol. 32:1
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bridging the divide between individual and mass crimes, it fails on a dif-
ferent ground: it does not translate well across cultures. These problems
also arise in the structural features of international criminal law-some
do not function well in addressing mass, rather than individual, violence;
other features do not work in different cultural contexts; still others fail
on both counts.27 This Section presents a few examples of each: the em-
phasis on individual accountability, the stringent procedural safeguards,
and the limitations on the scope of factual findings.
While an emphasis on individual accountability may be effective in
prosecuting crimes in the domestic context, it has serious drawbacks
when applied to atrocities that are by their nature collective. By center-
ing blame on active perpetrators, often limited in number, international
criminal law fails to address the actions of bystanders who failed to stop
or even benefited from the atrocities.29 Unlike domestic crimes, mass
crimes require the complicity of large segments of society. As a result,
accountability efforts must engage with these individuals if they are to
reconstruct social norms opposing mass violence.30
The strict emphasis on procedural due process intrinsic to interna-
tional criminal law, while not inherently inappropriate in addressing mass
crimes, limits the ability to speak to local populations." International
criminal law has a very small menu of acceptable formats, all of which
require strong procedural safeguards for defendants.32 These stringent
standards, drawn largely from Western domestic criminal law, may
27. See, e.g., Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair:
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 582-603
(2002).
28. See Robert M. Hayden, Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Popula-
tion Transfers, 55 SLAVIC REv. 727, 742-43 (1996). Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 3
(explaining that the purpose of trials for genocide and related crimes is not to punish the indi-
vidual defendant but to publicize collective wrongdoing, and suggesting that a trial of the
individual might undermine this objective).
29. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 26-28. See generally Laurel E. Fletcher, From
Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice, 26 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1013 (2005) (detailing the problem that complicit bystanders present to the achievement of
justice through individual trials in the case of mass atrocities).
30. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 98-99; KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF
GERMAN GUILT 46-47 (E. B. Ashton trans., 2001).
31. Even within American society, judgments of fairness do not necessarily correspond
to legal scholars' vision of due process-in one study, people rated plea bargaining to be fairer
than a trial, and other studies have found that people rate mediation to be fairer than a trial.
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 319 (2003) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice].
32. Drumbl, Criminology, supra note 16, at 272-73 (arguing that international criminal
law is more strongly influenced by common law than by civil law, as illustrated by the use of
precedent and inductive reasoning in reaching decisions, adversarial process, availability of
plea bargain, extensive cross-examination, role of defense counsel, and amici).
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conflict with elements of accountability prioritized by local populations."
For example, the defendants' rights to confrontation and to a speedy trial
may conflict with the victims' interest in telling their stories as wit-
nesses; in some cultural contexts, the latter might be more important
than the former. While the structure of international criminal law offers
some flexibility, there is little scope for restricting the rights of defen-
dants.
International criminal law's embrace of only a narrow set of facts is
problematic on both counts. First, it is not well suited to situations of
mass violence where the "truth" is violently disputed." This narrowness
of scope may lead those who disagree with the context dictated by the
trial-holder to reject the implementing mechanism. In situations of
mass violence, perpetrators comprise a large proportion of the popula-
tion, and even those who did not themselves commit crimes may have
signed on to the regime's depiction of reality-a depiction entirely at
odds with the version of the facts on which international criminal law
allows transitional justice institutions to rely." International criminal
law's failure to address this broader audience seriously limits its ability
to account for mass atrocities.
Perhaps more importantly, because international criminal law fo-
cuses only on individual actors, it overlooks broader structural causes of
mass atrocities and therefore fails to speak to local populations.3 " There
are numerous factors-political, economic, historical, and colonial-that
set the stage for mass violence." Other states, which cannot be called as
defendants before internationalized criminal courts, often bear signifi-
33. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 7-8; Jenia lontcheva Turner, Defense Perspec-
tives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 539 (2008)
(arguing that shifting the focus of trials to peace and reconciliation can create tensions with
the Western legal model's rigorous protections of due process).
34. Turner, supra note 33, at 539-41.
35. Mirjan Damaika, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 329, 336-37 (2008). E.g., Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Jus-
tice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 463,
476-77 (2009) [hereinafter Clark, Retributive Justice] (demonstrating that, even after the
ICTY proceedings, the "truth" is still disputed in Bosnia and Herzegovina).
36. JASPERS, supra note 30, at 46-47; Damatka, supra note 35, at 345 (claiming that the
public's perception of legitimacy depends on the court's procedures and decision).
37. Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 12, 17. This is not to say that a transitional justice
mechanism must accept the perpetrators' propaganda in order to speak to much of the afflicted
society, but the mechanism could recognize a broader range of facts, thus rendering its find-
ings more difficult to reject and more likely to be internalized.
38. Id. at 14.
39. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 84, 153, 172; Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Clo-
sure: Lessons of the Tadid Judgment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 2031, 2054-56 (1998) [hereinafter
Alvarez, Rush to Closure].
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cant responsibility for mass atrocities." Even those countries that did not
play a part in instigating the violence may have failed to intervene suc-
cessfully, and international criminal law's inability to recognize this may
be viewed by locals as an attempt to deflect attention from such fail-
ures.4' As a result, local populations may be skeptical of international
criminal law processes and significantly less likely to accept them as
legitimate.42
The assessment should not be surprising. Patterned after laws that
address very different crimes, international criminal law is not well de-
signed to account for mass violence.43 Its goals and structure are flawed
in at least two ways: they do not take into account differences between
individual crimes and mass crimes, and they do not translate well across
different cultural contexts. These problems, and the shortcomings of the
mechanisms used to implement international criminal law, described in
more detail in Part III, point to the need for a total reevaluation of our
current approach to transitional justice.
II. THEORIZING LEGITIMACY
The preceding Section describes the design flaws of international
criminal law that limit its ability to address crimes of mass violence.
Taking as a starting point that these shortcomings can and should be ad-
dressed through a more effective design process, this Section begins
from first principles. What should transitional justice aim to achieve?
How should it go about doing so? In order to transition from mass vio-
lence into a functional society, upended moral norms must be
reestablished. Effective norm reconstruction requires that societal stake-
holders, particularly afflicted populations, perpetrators, and political elites,
view these new or revitalized norms against mass violence as legitimate.
Norms perceived to be legitimate are significantly more likely to be
40. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 84, 153. See Martti Koskenniemi, Between
Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y'BOOK U.N. LAw 1, 18-19 (2002).
41. Luban, supra note 22, at 13.
42. Clark, Retributive Justice, supra note 35, at 472-73 (reporting that those inter-
viewed in Bosnia and Herzegovina "wanted a much broader responsibility to be addressed,
and criminal trials do not do this").
43. CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1996). Costantino and Merchant describe three criteria for evaluating dispute
resolution systems: efficiency (comprised of change in cost and change in time), effectiveness
(comprised of nature of outcome, durability of resolution, and effect on environment), and
satisfaction (with process, relationship, and outcome). Id. See generally Robert Bordone, Dis-
pute System Design: An Introduction, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 2008 SYMP. (Mar. 7, 2008),
http:/Iblogs.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/files/2008/03/dsdintroduction3-7-08.pdf (describing con-
siderations that should be taken into consideration in designing a dispute system).
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internalized by the relevant players. This internalization will enable the
norms laid out by the transitional justice mechanism to take root fully, rec-
reating the moral fabric of a society recovering from mass violence.
A. Defining Legitimacy
Legitimacy is a complex concept, with a rich literature describing
and analyzing its various manifestations. This Article argues that transi-
tional justice mechanisms should seek to maximize both sociological
and legal dimensions of legitimacy." Max Weber was perhaps the first
scholar to put forward a sociological definition of legitimacy. In his trea-
tise Economy and Society, first published in 1922, Weber describes an
ethically normative belief as "one to which men attribute a certain type
of value and which, by virtue of this belief, they treat as a valid norm
governing their action."" Such beliefs can be buttressed through legal,
religious, or social guarantees, the latter constituting sociological legiti-
macy." As Richard Fallon explains, while legal legitimacy assumes that
that which is lawful is legitimate, an institution achieves sociological
legitimacy when the "relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate,
or otherwise deserving of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or
mere hope for personal reward."47
Sociological legitimacy is a subjective concept, defined by actors'
perceptions of institutions and rules.48 When an institution is viewed as
legitimate, actors internalize the social norms it promulgates, which
means that the norms begin to define how an actor conceives of her in-
terests. In graphical form:
44. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 1787, 1794-97 (2005) (describing three forms of legitimacy: legal, sociological, and
moral).
45. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 36 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978).
46. Id.
47. Fallon, supra note 44, at 1795. See also Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy, in THE Ox-
FORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 704, 707 (Daniel Bodansky et a].
eds., 2007) [hereinafter Bodansky, Legitimacy] ("Legitimacy lies somewhere between rational
persuasion and compulsion as a basis for action. In contrast to rational persuasion, legitimacy
involves the notion of deference (or in the stronger case, obedience)-that is, performing an
act not because one is convinced, on the merits, that the act is right but simply because another
has directed it."); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORGS.
379, 381 (1999) [hereinafter Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority] ("[L]egitimacy . . . refers to the
normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.").
48. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority, supra note 47, at 381. Hurd uses the term "legiti-
macy" to reference the concept that this Article refers to as "sociological legitimacy." Id.
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Legitimacy of transitional justice mechanism
I
Internalization of norms promulgated by mechanism
When an actor's sense of her own interests is at least in part constituted
by a community norm, we see internalization of that norm. The actor no
longer perceives a conflict between her interests and the obligations im-
posed by the norm. Moreover, noncompliance with the norm will entail
psychic costs to the actor.49 Legitimate social institutions may be able to
reconstruct social norms, thereby changing not only the behavior but
also the belief system of relevant actors.
So why does sociological legitimacy matter for transitional justice
mechanisms? Political scientists and legal scholars argue that legitimacy
is a crucial component of a social institution's effectiveness; it "affects
the decision calculus of actors with respect to compliance ... and it is
key to [a social institution] being recognized by actors as 'authorita-
tive.',o In other words, legitimacy is necessary for compliance, and a
supranational tribunal's ability to compel compliance renders it effec-
tive." If an institution is viewed as legitimate, actors will defer to its
decisions even when they disagree with the substance of these decisions,
and regardless of the threat of sanctions.52 As a result, achieving legiti-
macy is of paramount importance to transitional justice mechanisms,
because it enables these institutions to obtain compliance without the
threat of sanction and to foster peace and reconciliation."
In a similar vein, the social psychology literature suggests that in or-
der to build a law-abiding society, internalized compliance, rather than
externalized enforcement, is necessary.54 Internalization is the most ef-
fective way to change individual incentives, particularly in post-atrocity
societies in which enforcement mechanisms are likely to be weak.
49. Id. at 388.
50. IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY & POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL 12 (2007). See, e.g., Tallgren, supra note 16, at 570-71 (explaining that
the internalization of moral values behind punishment is necessary for deterrence, and that a
prerequisite to this internalization is that the punishing system enjoys legitimacy and the pun-
ishing organ enjoys authority).
51. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 11, at 283, 290.
52. Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law, in LEGITIMACY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 310 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Volker Roben eds., 2008) [hereinafter
Bodansky, Concept of Legitimacy]; Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of
Global Governance Institutions, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 25, 31.
53. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CAL. L. REv. 75, 97 (2005).
54. Tyler & Darley, supra note 19, at 714-17.
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Instead of resting compliance on the notion that "law-breaking behavior
is deterred by the risk of being caught and punished for wrongdoing," it
is more effective to create a society "in which people are motivated ...
by a desire to act in socially appropriate and ethical ways," and thus
self-regulate by internalizing the responsibility to follow the law." This
"[c]ooperation and consent" will enhance not only acceptance of an ac-
countability mechanism's decisions or outcomes in the short-term, but
also long-term compliance with "decisions and directives of legal au-
thorities."
Social psychologist Tom Tyler explains that legitimacy is necessary to
ensure internalization. "[T]he ability to secure voluntary compliance with
the law and legal decisions is linked to the attitudes of the population.""
Voluntary deference to the law requires members of society to believe
"that the behaviors prohibited by law are also immoral" and that "legal
authorities are entitled to be obeyed."" Efforts to reconstruct societies that
have suffered mass atrocities should, then, focus on the morality and le-
gitimacy of transitional justice mechanisms and their findings in order to
reconstitute ethical norms and ensure maximal compliance with decisions
and outcomes." In graphical form,
Legitimacy of transitional justice mechanism
'I
Internalization of norms promulgated by mechanism
Reconstruction of social norms opposed to mass violence
As described further below, the authority of internationalized crimi-
nal courts has rested primarily on legal legitimacy, which is insufficient
in achieving the goals of transitional justice mechanismsi6 Particularly
55. Id. at 707.
56. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 31, at 286. Phillip Rapoza, Hybrid Criminal
Tribunals and the Concept of Ownership: Who Owns the Process?, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
525, 526 (2006).
57. Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and
to Legal Authorities, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 983, 985 (2000) [hereinafter Tyler, Multicultur-
alism].
58. Tyler & Darley, supra note 19, at 707.
59. See Tyler, Multiculturalism, supra note 57, at 985.
60. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and
"The Rule of Law," 101 MicH. L. REv. 2275, 2322 (2003) ("[Rule-of-law promotion efforts]
tend to confuse formal law with substantive normative commitments, assuming that the sub-
stantive values that are at the core of most western concepts of the rule of law will flow
naturally from the creation of certain kinds of formal legal structures (modernized statutes,
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with regard to international law, which cannot rely on effective enforce-
ment mechanisms, it is not enough for law to be viewed as binding (legal
legitimacy). It must also be perceived as fair and reasonable by those to
whom its norms are addressed (sociological legitimacy)." Sociological
legitimacy can effect legal transformation; "[i]f a legal rule is widely
regarded as illegitimate by those to whom it is addressed, it is likely to
be disregarded with increasing frequency, even if such violations con-
tinue to entail sanctions provided by law."62
Legitimacy can be measured in at least two ways.6 ' This Article
seeks to assess the empirical dimensions of legitimacy, asking whether
the authority of transitional justice institutions is accepted by those
whom it purports to govern and serve. This subjective approach to le-
gitimacy can be performed only by determining whether the actors
whom the institution seeks to govern acknowledge its legitimacy. 4 This
is a tall order; given that a transitional justice mechanism must appeal to
strikingly different normative views, actors must accept that the institu-
tion will not live up to their normative ideal.6 ' As discussed further
below, this Article proposes that the effectiveness of transitional justice
mechanisms be measured by perceptions of legitimacy on the part of
relevant actors, and that this measurement take the form of rigorous em-
pirical study.
courts, etc.). In practice, these rule-of-law promotion efforts stumble when they come up
against countervailing cultural commitments that are resistant to clumsy and formalistic ef-
forts to change them.").
61. See Hanspeter Neuhold, Legitimacy: A Problem in International Law and for Inter-
national Lawyers?, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 52, at 335, 351 ("[A]
legal order in which resort to coercion for the implementation of its norms is not the exception
but the rule is neither politically desirable, nor likely to be durable .... ).
62. Id. at 337. See also THoMAs M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NA-
TIONs 21 (1990) ("[The failure to follow international law may be caused by a] lack of
legitimacy in rules and institutional processes by which they are made, interpreted and ap-
plied."). Professor Franck's book is part of an extensive literature, some of it deeply grounded
in sociology, analyzing state compliance with international law. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks,
supra note 11, at 638-56 (describing the theory of "acculturation" as a means of influencing
the behavior of a state); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Incomplete Internalization and Com-
pliance with Human Rights Law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 725 (2008) (responding to an objection
to the theory of acculturation); Koh, supra note 11, at 2645-59 (describing the process by
which a nation internalizes norms as legitimate); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lec-
ture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 633-42 (1998) (presenting
different theories of why nations comply with international law). Because this Article focuses
on individual compliance with international and national institutions, it does not draw exten-
sively from this sociology-based literature.
63. Bodansky, Legitimacy, supra note 47, at 709 ("Legitimacy has two dimensions, one
empirical and the other normative."). This Article does not address the conceptually prior
concern of whether an institution's authority is normatively justified, but explores only wheth-
er the authority has sociological legitimacy.
64. HURD, supra note 50, at 31.
65. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 52, at 30.
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This legitimacy measure should be central to the design of transitional
justice mechanisms.' How do we increase their legitimacy? Perceptions of
legitimacy of a particular rule or institution may derive from the source
from which it has been constituted, the procedure by which it has been
adopted, or the substance of the rule itself.7 In graphical form,
Look to source, procedure, and substance
4
Legitimacy of transitional justice mechanism
I
Internalization of norms promulgated by mechanism
I
Reconstruction of social norms opposed to mass violence
As discussed further below, transitional justice mechanisms could be
better designed to strengthen legitimacy along each of these three di-
mensions. This is not an easy task in the transitional justice context as
these bases of legitimacy are likely not only to vary, but to clash, across
actors, societies, and cultures.66 Factors that may legitimize an institution
in the eyes of one transitional justice actor are likely to delegitimize it
from the viewpoint of another.
B. Legitimacy for Whom?
As the case studies will illustrate, ensuring internalization of ac-
countability proceedings by all affected parties is a tall order. Perhaps
the closest we can come is to increase the perceived legitimacy of the
transitional justice mechanism so that the relevant players will find it
difficult to reasonably reject its decisions. Who are these players whose
approval is needed to further the transitional justice project? There are at
least three groups of players within the affected society: victims of the
mass violence, perpetrators of the atrocities, and political elites. More-
over, to ensure that assistance is forthcoming, international justice
proponents must also accept the mechanism's legitimacy. To be sure,
66. Bodansky, Concept of Legitimacy, supra note 52, at 312 (emphasizing both norma-
tive and empirical legitimacy).
67. Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority, supra note 47, at 381; Bodansky, Legitimacy, su-
pra note 47, at710il1.
68. Bodansky, Legitimacy, supra note 47, at 711-12; Bodansky, Concept of Legitimacy,
supra note 52, at 314.
69. Bodansky, Concept of Legitimacy, supra note 52, at 314.
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these groups are not monolithic, and interests will differ within these
groups, but this Article takes as a starting point that most of the time,
divergences in interests relating to legitimacy within the groups will be
smaller than divergences between the groups.
Assuming that transitional justice is a democratic enterprise, percep-
tions of legitimacy by non-elite members of the affected society should
be the central marker of success. These individuals may be victims of the
violence, perpetrators of the violence, or both. Some will have accepted
the social norms that enabled the violence, and others will have rejected
them entirely; a successful transition needs to speak to both groups. This
crucial requirement has been consistently absent from accountability
processes thus far,70 resulting in many of the legitimacy concerns levied
against international criminal courts. Both victims and perpetrators may
also have concerns about the fairness of the process; victims will worry
that the process may become corrupted or controlled by those responsi-
ble for mass violence, and perpetrators may worry that trials will not be
fair as those charged will be assumed from the start to be guilty.
If transitional justice is to be successful in reconstructing social
norms, the process must incorporate the perspective of the victims of the
atrocities. Without such attention to the victims' interests, for reasons
described above, transitional justice mechanisms risk being rejected as
culturally irrelevant and failing to impact social norms. Of course, the
interests of victims will vary within societies and are affected by factors
including how directly they suffered violence and their socioeconomic
position prior to the violence.7 ' There is no transitional justice solution
that will satisfy every individual who suffered mass atrocities, but there
is still a great deal of room for improvement in aligning current models
with the expressed interests of different victim groups.
One victim group that may be most frequently overlooked by con-
temporary transitional justice mechanisms is that of individuals who
were both perpetrators and victims. In Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, for
example, many perpetrators viewed themselves also as victims.
72 In some
70. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 63.
71. See, e.g., JUDICIAL SYs. MONITORING PROGRAMME, UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS:
COMMUNITY VIEWS ON CAVR's COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS 20 (2004) (present-
ing the views of one victim who was dissatisfied with community reconciliation procedures);
Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Social Reconstruction as a Local Process, 2 INT'L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 152, 154-57 (2008) (describing the difficulties of addressing the violence
in Guatemala in the 1980s, particularly that caused by the diversity within the victim popula-
tion).
72. JUDICIAL SYs. MONITORING PROGRAMME, supra note 71, at 16; POST-CONFLICT
REINTEGRATION INITIATIVE FOR DEv. & EMPOWERMENT & THE INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSI-
TIONAL JUSTICE, Ex-COMBATANT VIEWS OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
AND THE SPECIAL COURT IN SIERRA LEONE 11 (2002), available at http://www.ictj.org/
images/content/0/9/090.pdf [hereinafter PRIDE & ICTJ].
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cases, this may reflect the nature of the violence-for example, in Sierra
Leone, eighty-one percent of female combatants questioned in a survey
reported that they had been forcibly conscripted.73 Moreover, in most
instances of mass violence, even in situations where one group was re-
sponsible for starting the atrocities or perpetrated more atrocities than
other groups, members of each group fell victim to the violence.74 The
complexities of situations of mass violence often make it difficult to
draw clear lines between perpetrators and victims. A successful transi-
tional justice mechanism must recognize this challenge and approach
accountability with an eye to incorporating the interests of all victims,
not only those with clean hands.
To go a step further, it is important to design transitional justice me-
chanisms to draw in all perpetrators. Without the participation of
perpetrators, any accountability effort will be incomplete and unstable.
This is a lofty goal that will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, as
some perpetrators will always take issue with efforts to account for their
crimes. Moreover, as discussed further below, the perspectives of victims
and perpetrators are likely to conflict; this Article does not argue that the
latter should override the former. Simply stated, a transitional justice
mechanism that is viewed as legitimate by as many perpetrators as pos-
sible because it incorporates as many of their interests as possible will be
more effective than one that ignores the interests of perpetrators entirely.
It may be, for example, that atrocities were committed by more than one
group in society or that outside forces, including foreign states, played a
role in the conflict. By recognizing these realities, a transitional justice
mechanism is more likely to draw perpetrators into the fold.
Perpetrators bring important cards to the table in any transitional jus-
tice effort. First of all, they have unique knowledge of the conflict; it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to create an accurate historical record
without participation of perpetrators in identifying those responsible and
describing the planning and execution of atrocities. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, if perpetrators entirely reject the legitimacy of a tran-
sitional justice mechanism, it will fail in its efforts to reconstruct social
norms against mass violence. In such a situation, defendants may meet
with some success in their efforts to be viewed as martyrs for their cause,
further reinforcing divisions in society and eviscerating any societal pro-
73. PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note 72, at 13.
74. See, e.g., Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 27, at 602 (finding, in a study of the
attitudes of judges and prosecutors in Bosnia to war crimes trials, that all participants identi-
fied their national group as a victim).
75. Janine Natalya Clark, Genocide, War Crimes and the Conflict in Bosnia: Under-
standing the Perpetrators, 11 J. GENOCIDE REs. 421 (2009) (explaining the need to understand
the motivations of the perpetrator).
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gress through accountability. Finally, in order to rebuild society, perpe-
trators must be reintegrated and participate in reconciliation efforts.
Given that many perpetrators may not believe that they have done
anything wrong-they were simply following the prevalent social
norms-their belief in the legitimacy of the transitional justice mecha-
nism is crucial. In order to rebuild social norms, perpetrators must first
understand that the prior norms that encouraged violence were inappro-
priate, and that their participation in the crimes was unacceptable. Such a
change of perspective may never happen in some circumstances and may
take many years to come about in others, but will be nearly impossible in
any case without norm internalization by perpetrators.
It is also important to ensure that political elites in the affected soci-
ety view the process as legitimate. Otherwise, political elites can use
their not insubstantial power to stymie transitional justice efforts or sim-
ply reject them as illegitimate, thus impeding any beneficial impact on
the local justice system and the rule of law. As further discussed below,
political elites can use legitimacy critiques to capture transitional justice
efforts for their own benefit. These political motives vary; elites may aim
to prevent themselves and/or powerful allies from being tried or to gain
political advantage over competitors or enemies. This is where it begins
to get tricky: a successful transitional justice mechanism needs to reso-
nate sufficiently with the non-elite members of the affected society so
that political elites cannot reject it with insincere legitimacy criticisms,
but it also needs to prevent capture by the self-serving interests of politi-
cal elites. This is another ambitious goal, and again, it may not be
possible to achieve this outcome. However, without norm internalization
by domestic political elites, any transitional justice project is likely to
fail, so it is important that accountability mechanisms attempt to increase
perceptions of legitimacy by these players.
International justice proponents are another important stakeholder in
transitional justice efforts, as they often hold the purse strings and the ear
of the media. By using the term "international justice proponents," this
Article aims to narrow the broad "international community" into a group
that presents largely similar concerns about transitional justice and has
great investment and participation in transitional justice mechanisms.
This group is perhaps best exemplified by international non-
governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, but also includes United Nations staff and some officials
76. For example, in Sierra Leone, only 15% of ex-combatants surveyed thought that
they had done something wrong. PRIDE & ICTJ, supra note 72, at 12.
77. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 13; Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 16, at 817-19
(citing transitions to democracy literature from political science and noting the important role
of elites in ensuring peace and stability).
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from Western governments with authority in the international arena, as
well as some scholars of international law and some domestic
non-governmental organizations." To be sure, there are those who would
consider themselves supporters of international efforts to bring perpetra-
tors of mass atrocity to justice who hold perspectives different than those
laid out below, but this Article focuses on the group described above to
represent a particular perspective on transitional justice.
International justice proponents as defined above are likely to focus
on procedural fairness concerns, some of which may overlap, and some
of which may conflict, with domestic populations' criticisms. These cri-
tiques largely focus on values such as fairness, impartiality, transparency,
and independence.7 9 So, for example, both international justice propo-
nents and victims of mass violence might be concerned with the
continued employment of perpetrators of the mass violence in the justice
system; or on the other end of the spectrum, international justice propo-
nents and perpetrators might be concerned with the employment of only
victims in the justice system. The international justice proponents also
concern themselves with capacity,"o often an issue in post-conflict socie-
ties as legal skills and infrastructure have been destroyed, as well as
corruption, a problem that arises often with an influx of donor dollars to
an impoverished state." These procedural concerns may conflict with the
78. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 9, 94.
79. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH [HRW], JUSTICE IN MOTION: THE TRIAL PHASE
OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2005/11/02/justice-motion (focusing on trial management, fair trial rights, and wit-
nesss protection); HRW, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN RWANDA 70
(2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/24/law-and-reality- (noting that
the Rwandan justice system does not assure "basic fair trial standards" including "the
presumption of innocence, the right of equal access to justice, the right to present witnesses in
one's own defense, . . . and the right to protection from double jeopardy," and "judicial au-
thorities operate in a political context where the executive continues to dominate the judiciary
and where there is an official antipathy to views diverging from those of the government and
the dominant party . . . ."); HRW, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY MATTERS
FOR PEACE 1 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.orglen/node/84262/section/2 (noting the
importance of evidentiary rules in conferring legitimacy on factual findings of international-
ized criminal courts); OPEN Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AT THE
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (2010), available at
http://ww.soros.orgfinitiatives/justice/focusrintemationaljustice/articles-publications/publications/
political-interference-report-20100706 (focusing on judicial independence at the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia); Other International and Internationalized Courts,
AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/other-courts (last
visited Oct. 10, 2010) (critiquing internationalized courts as having some "statutes and rules
[that] are flawed and not consistent with the highest standards of international justice").
80. See, e.g., HRW, MAKING KAMPALA COUNT: ADVANCING THE GLOBAL FIGHT
AGAINST IMPUNITY AT THE ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE § IV (2010), available at http://www.
hrw.org/en/reports/2010/05/10/making-kampala-count (discussing capacity building).
81. See, e.g., OPEN SOC'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE Ex-
TRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA: MARCH 2010, 11-12 (2010),
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legitimacy concerns expressed by domestic groups, as methods of ad-
dressing conflict that resonate within a society may not meet the due
process standards upheld by international justice proponents. In transi-
tional justice mechanisms to date, the international justice proponents'
concerns have generally been paramount, perhaps because they often
provide much of the funding and technical support for transitional justice
mechanisms in the developing world.
It is of course an impossible task to design a transitional justice
mechanism that will achieve complete internalization by each of these
groups of players. It is, however, possible to improve contemporary tran-
sitional justice mechanisms by considering all of these perspectives
during the design process in order to increase perceptions of legitimacy
by as many players as possible. Past efforts have often focused on the
perspective of international justice proponents, who raise important con-
cerns, to the exclusion of other equally important viewpoints and thus to
the detriment of the legitimacy of transitional justice efforts. Moreover,
accountability mechanisms designed without concern for the interests of
all players may inadvertently privilege the position of political elites who
can then manipulate the institution to serve their interests. By increasing
perceptions of legitimacy by as many players as possible, transitional
justice mechanisms can ensure greater internalization of their findings
and judgments, thereby becoming more effective at reconstructing social
norms against mass violence.
C. Limiting Domination
This inclusive approach to transitional justice design raises the ques-
tion of how to address preference conflicts, particularly where an
expressed preference leads to oppression. That is, if a transitional justice
mechanism is to include as many voices as possible, how do we priori-
tize among competing preferences? How do we ensure that the
prioritized preferences do not repeat patterns of domination? In other
words, in the quest for legitimacy through inclusiveness, how do we en-
sure that we do not act illegitimately by excluding less dominant
voices? 2 Three different academic disciplines-moral philosophy,
political science, and social psychology-provide guidance in resolving
this complex and challenging issue.
available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/intemational-jusfice/articles-publications/
publications/cambodia-20100324/cambodia-court-20100
324 .pdf [hereinafter OPEN Soc'Y
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS] (discussing anticorruption measures in Cambo-
dia).
82. Thanks to Jerry Vildostegui for consistently raising and helping me to frame this
query.
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We can start with the assumption that conflict between voices is in-
evitable in the creation of a transitional justice mechanism, as substantial
conceptions of justice will always vary." If we take as a given that con-
flict is a normal state, moral philosopher Stuart Hampshire suggests that
societies should focus on creating institutions and procedures to resolve
these conflicts fairly rather than asserting universal truths.M Beyond lim-
ited procedural requirements of reasonable regulation of conflict,"
Hampshire argues that any outcome must be morally acceptable." How-
ever, this laissez-faire approach to conflict resolution must be limited in
two ways. First, efforts to impose a substantial conception of justice
through force or domination are unacceptable." Second, "primary evils"
such as massacre and torture are to be prevented at all costs." While this
theoretical approach offers some helpful guidance in addressing differing
viewpoints in transitional justice mechanism process design, the concrete
details, such as the definition of force and domination and the scope of
"primary evils," are less easily resolved.
From the discipline of political science, we can draw on democratic
justice theory, which focuses on process design as a way to resolve dis-
putes over substantive conceptions of the good in a pluralist society.
Similar to the moral philosophy approach laid out above, this theory ac-
cepts a broad range of beliefs but not of behaviors, arguing that
domination should be limited as far as possible." Helpfully, it also offers
a definition of domination, which arises only from the illegitimate exer-
cise of power but includes "shaping agendas, constraining options, and,
in the limiting case, influencing people's preferences and desires."" So-
cieties can limit domination by structuring institutions to maximize
83. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 4-5 (2000).
84. Id. at 40.
85. Hampshire suggests two: a "universal rational requirement of two-sidedness and
respect for locally established and familiar rules of procedure." Id. at 97-98. Legal scholar
Carrie Menkel-Meadow challenges the binary dialectic of Hampshire's proposed procedures.
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J.
347, 358 (2004-2005) ("Disagreements may exist along a spectrum of views . . . with multiple
challenges and forms of resolution, especially when multiple parties are involved.").
86. See HAMPSHIRE, supra note 83, at 40-41.
87. Id. at 41.
88. Id. at 43 ("[T]hese primary evils stay constant and undeniable as evils to be at all
costs averted, or almost all costs.").
89. IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 234 (1999) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC
JUSTICE]; IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3, 102-03 (2003) [hereinafter
SHAPIRO, THEORY]; Ian Shapiro, Group Aspirations and Democratic Politics, in DEMOC-
RACY'S EDGES 210, 220 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Shapiro, Group Aspirations].
90. SHAPIRO, THEORY, supra note 89, at 4.
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inclusive participation;9' the theory suggests that "everyone affected by
the operation of a particular domain of civil society should be presumed
to have a say in its governance." 92 In particular, a "right to demand in-
creased deliberation [should be awarded] to those who are vulnerable in
a given situation because their basic interests are at stake."93 However,
efforts must also be made to enfranchise the opposition by offering dif-
ferent avenues to pursue their goals.M In this way, a society can create
"systems that give aspiring political leaders active incentives to avoid
mobilizing forms of identity that exacerbate cultural competition and to
devise, instead, ideologies that can appeal across the divisions of such
groups."5
Finally, social psychology scholars offer suggestions for preventing
factions from resorting to the use of force to promote their perspective.
The theory posits that members of opposing factions will become more
collectively oriented and cooperative if common group membership is
made salient. People who identify more with their faction than with the
society as a whole are likely to be more concerned with outcomes than
with process, and thus less likely to compromise in ways that are neces-
sary to rebuild a society devastated by mass violence. If dispute
resolution processes can be designed to encourage engagement, people
will be less likely to resort to other-perhaps violent-strategies for re-
solving disputes. In short, an inclusive process itself helps to prevent
domination and violence, but specific protections should be designed to
91. Shapiro, Group Aspirations, supra note 89, at 220 ("The challenge ... is to devise
mechanisms that increase the likelihood that people will live in conditions of inclusive partici-
pation and non-domination.").
92. SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 89, at 37. Shapiro does offer the caveat
that there may be compelling reasons to distribute governing authority unequally, and in some
circumstances, to disenfranchise some participants. Id.
93. SHAPIRO, THEORY, supra note 89, at 36. Basic interests are defined as "obvious
essentials that [people] need to develop into and survive as independent agents in the world as
it is likely to exist for their lifetimes." Id. at 45.
94. Id. at 90.
95. Shapiro, Group Aspirations, supra note 89, at 219.
96. Tyler, Multiculturalism, supra note 57, at 1005.
97. See id. at 1016. Like the moral philosophy and political science literature discussed
above, the social psychology literature does not address the specific issues confronted by a
society recovering from mass violence, but offers more generally applicable suggestions on
encouraging factions to identify with the society as a whole. Tyler presents two strategies
toward this goal: demonstrating that members of different factions are "valued and worthy of
respect" and including them in the authority structure of the society. Id. at 1014-15.
98. David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Govern-
ment Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens' Roles in Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 33 (2008).
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ensure that the voices of particularly vulnerable groups are heard and
prioritized."
III. ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTEMPORARY
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS
Using perceptions of legitimacy as the measure, this Section assesses
the performance of contemporary transitional justice mechanisms. As dis-
cussed above, international criminal law's design flaws have inhibited its
ability to address mass crimes, particularly in different cultural contexts.
As a result, its implementing mechanisms-namely, internationalized
criminal courts-have not fared well in the eyes of local populations. The
ad hoc tribunals' failure to incorporate local preferences into their design
process led to widespread rejection of these courts by members of the
affected societies. In theory, hybrid courts were designed to harness the
benefits of both national and international criminal courts, ensuring the
support of local populations and international justice proponents alike,
but in practice they have failed to adequately incorporate local prefer-
ences into their design processes. At the same time, the first five years of
the International Criminal Court's existence have been marked by seri-
ous criticism on the part of societies the court seeks to serve. In some
cases, the preference disconnect has enabled political elites to capture
these institutions and utilize them for their own political purposes, which
are most often at odds with goals of transitional justice.'"m On the other
side of the spectrum, deeply incorporating local preferences but present-
ing other design flaws, lie truth and reconciliation commissions and
locally grounded accountability processes.'o' This Section catalogues the
99. See, e.g., DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 204 ("Victims should be entitled to
constitute themselves as they see fit for the purpose of filing claims and should be given quali-
fied deference if not every individual member of the group meets exacting standing rules.").
100. William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of Interna-
tional Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 41 (2002) [hereinafter
Burke-White, Community of Courts] ("The international community must be on guard against
strengthening the hand of a regime or particular politician in the name of international
justice.").
101. This Article does not discuss national courts as a mechanism of transitional justice;
the pros and cons of these courts will be similar to those of hybrid courts. Other scholars,
though, have argued that the future of international criminal law may lie in national courts.
See, e.g., Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding
National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1, 81 (2009) [hereinafter
Baylis, Reassessing]; Burke-White, Community of Courts, supra note 100, at 13; Jenia lont-
cheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (2005)
[hereinafter Turner, Criminal Law]. While the application of international criminal law in a
domestic court within the country that suffered mass violence may provide the most appropri-
ate transitional justice mechanism in some situations, such an approach must be carefully
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promise and pitfalls of each mechanism from the perspective of local
populations, arguing that these must be carefully assessed if we are to
craft transitional justice mechanisms appropriate for each society recov-
ering from mass violence.
A. The Ad Hoc Tribunals
The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were widely hailed as the first post-
Nuremburg attempt to prosecute on an international level perpetrators of
mass violence.0o2 Though their goals may be noble, these courts have
struggled to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the societies they seek to
serve.'0o Local populations were not adequately invested in the ad hoc
tribunals from the start, and, as a result, have often rejected the courts'
findings.'O
tailored to the country in question. Moreover, though it might be appropriate in limited cir-
cumstances, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the courts of a country that did not suffer
mass violence in order to prosecute such crimes will often face insurmountable legitimacy
concerns. Such courts lack a link to the situs and victims of the crime and also face practical
challenges extraditing and obtaining custody over defendants. Burke-White, Community of
Courts, supra note 100, at 20.
102. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, A World Unto Itself? The Application of
International Justice in the Former Yugoslavia, in MY NEIGHBOR, My ENEMY: JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 29, 31-32 [hereinafter
Fletcher & Weinstein, World]. The U.N. Security Council established the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 to prosecute persons responsible for those
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia after
1991. S.C. Res. 808, 1 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). The conflict centered on an
attempt to forcibly remove a majority of the Croat, Muslim, and other non-Serb populations
from the Republic of Croatia and large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to create a
Serb-dominated state. Press Release, ICTY, Vojislav Seselj Indicted by the ICTY for Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes, CC/P.I.S/728e (Feb. 14, 2003). The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda was established to prosecute the acts of genocide and other serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and by Rwandan citizens in
neighboring states between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994). These violations were committed as part of a plan to exterminate the ethnic
Tutsi population of Rwanda as well as moderate Hutus. Prosecutor v. Jean De Dieu Kama-
hunda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, 15 (Jan. 22, 2004).
103. While legitimacy critiques have been made from the perspective of international
justice proponents as well, the bulk of the criticisms come from local populations. See, e.g.,
Alvarez, Rush to Closure, supra note 39, at 2063 (citing due process concerns with ad hoc
tribunals); Burke-White, Community of Courts, supra note 100, at 12 (noting the great ex-
pense of ad hoc tribunals, another factor that guaranteed the extinction of this breed of
transitional justice mechanisms); Danner & Martinez, supra note 53, at 97-100 (critiquing
procedural fairness in internationalized criminal courts).
104. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from
Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999); Des Forges & Longman, supra note 2; Fletcher &
Weinstein, World, supra note 102; John Hagan & Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, War Crimes, Democ-
racy, and the Rule of Law in Belgrade, the Former Yugoslavia, and Beyond, 605 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 130, 131 (2006); The Human Rights Ctr. and the Int'l Human Rights
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Local perceptions of the ICTY have been notoriously negative,os and
recent studies show that they have worsened over time.'" The only geo-
graphically comprehensive opinion survey to date was conducted in
early 2002;'0' over 7,000 respondents in seven of eight nations that com-
prised the former Yugoslavia revealed high awareness of, but low levels
of trust in, the ICTY'0a Serbian perceptions of the ICTY have been par-
ticularly negative and appear to be worsening; while fifty-eight percent
of respondents to a July 2003 survey held negative views of the court,
just over five years later, in the late spring of 2009, this figure increased
L. Clinic, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley & The Ctr. for Human Rights, Univ. of Sarajevo, Justice,
Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prose-
cutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 102 (2000).
105. In the words of then-ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald in 1999, "The Tri-
bunal is viewed negatively by large segments of the population of the former Yugoslavia. Its
work is frequently politicized and used for propaganda purposes by its opponents, who portray
the Tribunal as persecuting one or other ethnic groups and mistreating persons detained under
its authority." President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 6th Annual Rep. of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, transmitted by Note of the
Secretary-General, 148, U.N. Doc. A/54/187-S/1999/846 (Aug. 25, 1999) [hereinafter
UNGA, Former Yugoslavia]. This assessment, to be fair, was the impetus to establish an Out-
reach Program at the ICTY. See also Akhavan, supra note 7, at 22 (describing a survey
conducted in August 2000 in Croatia in which 60% of those polled believed that the ICTY was
"unfair"); Charles G. Boyd, Making Bosnia Work, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 42, 51 (1998) (discussing,
without attribution, a U.S. Information Agency poll finding that no more than 6% of members
of any ethnic group-Croats, Muslims, and Serbs-regarded bringing war criminals to justice
as important).
106. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & John Hagan, The ICTY Its Constituency, and the Politics:
The Battle for Hearts and Minds 37 (Aug. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442907.
107. Int'l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, South Eastern Europe: New
Means for Regional Analysis, http://archive.idea.int/balkans/surveydetailed.cfm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2010).
108. Pollsters from the South Eastern Europe Democracy Support network stated: "I will
read you a list of international institutions from our country. For each of them, please tell me
how much you trust them." The pollsters proceeded to list nine institutions: the International
Monetary Fund, the ICTY, the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Of the 610
Bosnians surveyed, 50.5% trusted the ICTY very much or a fair amount (the highest of the
nine institutions), as did 20.5% of the 1,010 Croatians surveyed (ranking it 6 of 9 institutions);
83.3% of 1,017 Kosovars (rank 2 of 9); 21.9% of 1,031 Macedonians (rank 8 of 9); 24.1% of
1,012 Montenegrans (rank 8 of 9); 7.6% of 1,523 Serbians (rank 8 of 9); and 3.6% of 1,034
residents of the Republica Srpska (rank 9 of 9). The survey instrument does not describe the
question(s) asked about awareness. Poll results found under the title "International Institutions
Awareness" show the ICTY scoring high across all countries: Bosnia 92.8% (the highest of the
nine institutions listed above); Croatia 93.1% (tied for rank 2 of 9); Kosovo 97.4% (rank 4 of
9); Macedonia 97.8% (rank 5 of 9); Montenegro 92.7% (rank I of 9); Serbia 94.7% (rank I of
9); and Republika Srpska 95.7% (1 of 9). Id.
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to seventy-two percent.'" Similarly, a set of seven surveys conducted
throughout the former Yugoslavia from 1997 through 2005 found that
perceptions of fairness of the ICTY decreased over that time period, even
among Bosnian and Croatian respondents."o
Though not as strikingly critical as local views of the ICTY, Rwan-
dan perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have
been lackluster at best. In a February 2002 survey of 2,000 Rwandans
concerning attitudes toward justice initiatives, a plurality (forty-seven
percent) of respondents had a neutral attitude toward the ICTR, though
Tutsi perceptions were primarily negative."' The most surprising result
from that survey, however, was that most respondents stated that they
were not well informed (fifty-six percent) or not informed at all (thirty-
one percent) about the ICTR."' Qualitative research performed by
Rwandan genocide expert Alison Des Forges also revealed that those
109. Compare BELGRADE CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLIC OPINION IN SERBIA: ATTI-
TUDES TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(ICTY) 28 (2003), available at http://english.bgcentar.org.rs/index.php?option=com
phocadownload&view=category&id=7 (summarizing face-to-face poll of 1545 respondents)
with Belgrade Ctr. for Human Rights & Org. for Sec. and Cooperation in Europe - Mission to
Serb., Public Perception in Serbia of the ICTY and the National Courts Dealing with War
Crimes 7 (2009), http://www.english.bgcentar.org.rs/images/stories/Datoteke/public percep-
tion of icty and the national courts dealing with war crimes Serbia 2009.ppt (summarizing
face-to-face poll of 1400 respondents). 71% of those surveyed thought that the ICTY did not
contribute to reconciliation in the region. Id. at 27.
110. Participants were asked, "Do you think that the International Tribunal conducts the
trials correctly and fairly and makes just decisions?" as part of surveys conducted in: Bosnia
and Herzegovina (85.9% of 289 respondents in 2000 and 41.9% of 471 respondents in 2003
thought the ICTY was fair); Croatia (87.4% of 249 respondents in 1997 and 53.6% of 498
respondents in 2004 viewed the ICTY as fair); Kosovo (88.1% of 493 respondents in 2004 saw
the ICTY as fair); and, Serbia (22.9% of 492 respondents in 2004 and 28.3% of 501 respon-
dents in 2005 found the ICTY to be fair). Ivkovic & Hagan, supra note 106, at 45, 53. The
authors of this study linked decreasing perceptions of fairness with views that the ICTY is
politicized, as well as preferences for domestic war crimes courts. Id. at 38.
111. These attitudes contrast starkly with overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward the
gacaca process, described further below, though of course that initiative was barely off the
ground at the time of this survey. Timothy Longman, Phuong Pham & Harvey M. Weinstein,
Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and Reconciliation
in Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF
MAsS ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 206, 207, 215 (face-to-face structured survey of 2,091
Rwandans from four communes in February 2002, using multi-stage cluster sampling). For
further methodological information, see id. at 207-09.
112. These were responses to the question, "How well informed do you feel about the
Arusha Tribunal?" Id. at 213. In response to the question of whether the Rwandan tribunals
had functioned well, only 14.3% of respondents stated that they were not informed (as op-
posed to 37.7% of responses to the question of whether the ICTR had functioned well). In
response to the question of whether they had confidence in the gacaca process, only 1.2% of
respondents said they were not informed. Id. at 214.
Michigan Journal of International Law
with knowledge of the tribunal felt that its work had little connection to
their daily lives."'
This lack of knowledge about, and inclusion in the work of, the tri-
bunals has led to negative perceptions of the ICTY and ICTR. Because
both tribunals were located far from where the mass violence occurred
and did not make sufficient efforts to bridge that distance, local popula-
tions did not participate in, attend, and in some cases even know about
the proceedings." 4 A qualitative survey of Bosnians conducted during the
summer of 2008 found that a widespread lack of knowledge about the
ICTY "tended to manifest itself in extremely critical views of this insti-
tution.""' The ICTY not only failed to seek the input of local judges in
the design phase but excluded nationals from holding positions on the
tribunal. These missteps led to perceptions by Croats and Serbs that the
court did not take their perspectives into account and contributed to a
lack of cultural understanding between the court and local populations."'
As a result, even those who might have been natural supporters of the
court, such as Croat legal professionals and Bosnian Muslims, have
found fault with the tribunal."'7 In the case of the ICTR, the adversarial
legal approach of that tribunal is simply alien to the Rwandan cultural
context and has contributed to local discontent with the court, including
the popular perception that witnesses before it were treated disrespect-
fully."' The ad hoc tribunals' failure to engage with members of the
affected societies and to adapt to the local cultural context created a dis-
connect that has often led locals to dismiss the courts' findings.'"
113. Des Forges & Longman, supra note 2, at 56. The chapter does not describe when
and where in Rwanda this research was performed, though it may have been in conjunction
with the February 2002 survey described by Longman et al., supra note 111.
114. In the words of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, then-President of the ICTY, in 1999,
"[T]he gap ... between justice and its beneficiaries-victims of the conflict-is exacerbated
by the Tribunal's physical location far from the former Yugoslavia." UNGA, Former Yugosla-
via, supra note 105, 147. See also STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 264-65, 269, 271-72;
Des Forges & Longman, supra note 2, at 56; Fletcher & Weinstein, World, supra note 102, at
33.
115. Clark, Retributive Justice, supra note 35, at 467 (describing 171 semi-structured
interviews in 25 different locations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina).
116. Fletcher & Weinstein, World, supra note 102, at 32; Turner, Criminal Law, supra
note 101, at 25-29.
117. Fletcher & Weinstein, World, supra note 102, at 40-41; William W. Burke-White,
The Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina,
46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279, 288, 288 n.28 (2008) (noting the Bosnian judiciary's objec-
tion to "legal colonialism" by the Office of the High Representative in implementing
procedural reforms to move courts from a civil law to an adversarial system).
118. Des Forges & Longman, supra note 2, at 56.
119. See ORENTLICHER & OPEN Soc'v JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 91
("[S]urvey results are consistent with the proposition that Serbian citizens' views are in gen-
eral more likely to be shaped by local leaders' attitudes than by judgments of the ICTY.").
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The dearth of support among local populations has enabled local el-
ites to leverage these courts for their own political purposes.20 The Tutsi-
dominated Rwandan government, for example, was able to prevent the
tribunal from investigating crimes perpetrated by the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (the Tutsi-led military force).'"' This has led to further concerns on
the part of Hutus that the ICTR is a biased institution that has chosen to
support the interests of the Tutsis.12 2 In the former Yugoslavia, nationalist
politicians have capitalized on the disconnect between the ICTY and lo-
cal populations to reject the tribunal as victor's justice and to spread
false propaganda about its work, thereby increasing their power base.123
Both courts have learned lessons from their failures, as have subse-
quent internationalized criminal courts, and have engaged in outreach
efforts to educate and engage local populations.' 24 Yet even these adapta-
tions have not been sufficient to overcome negative perceptions and
resist manipulation by political elites. It may be that an entirely different
process would have been more successful at reconstructing social norms.
Serbia's former foreign minister, for example, suggested that the point of
the tribunal should be to help Serbians to discuss the crimes rather than
120. In the words of then-ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald's annual report to
the UN General Assembly:
Throughout the region, the [ICTY] is often viewed as remote and disconnected
from the population and there is little information available about it. Such views are
exploited by authorities that do not recognize or cooperate with the tribunal, thereby
damaging efforts to foster reconciliation and impeding the work of the [tribunal].
UNGA, Former Yugoslavia, supra note 105, 1 148.
121. Des Forges & Longman, supra note 2, at 55. The Rwandan government objected to
the ICTR from its inception; while it favored an international court (to reduce the perception
of victor's justice), it was dissatisfied with the temporal jurisdiction (wanting the tribunal,
which focused on crimes committed between January 1 and December 31, 1994, to include
crimes from at least 1990); lack of capital punishment; insufficient resources (due in part to
sharing of human resources with the ICTY); and the failure to choose Rwanda as the seat of
the trial chamber. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 14-16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov.
8, 1994). During the Security Council's vote to establish the ICTR, the Rwandan government
representative noted that, because of these flaws, the tribunal "would only appease the con-
science of the international community rather than respond to the expectations of the
Rwandese people and of the victims of genocide in particular." Id. at 15.
122. Luc Reydams, The ICTR 10 Years On: Back to the Nuremburg Paradigm?, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 977, 977 (2005).
123. ORENTLICHER & OPEN Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 66. See Snyder
& Vinjamuri, supra note 16, at 21 (discussing survey results regarding the trust that various
groups in the former Yugoslavia have for the ICTY). See also Fletcher & Weinstein, World,
supra note 102, at 40.
124. DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED 102-05 (Open
Soc'y Justice Initiative ed., 2010) (describing "Bridging the Gap" and other outreach efforts of
the ICTY); David Cohen, "Hybrid" Justice in East Timor Sierra Leone, and Cambodia:
"Lessons Learned" and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2007).
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simply jailing defendants.'" As noted by the former senior outreach offi-
cer for the ICTY in Belgrade, workshops specifically tailored to young
Serbians have been extremely successful in altering perceptions of the
war, and have a "ripple effect" extending far beyond the participants in
the programs.16 Such dialogue may play a far more crucial role in attitu-
dinal change than trials, and should have been a part of the design
process of the ICTY from the start. Because of their serious shortcom-
ings, including those laid out above, the ad hoc tribunals are soon to be
an extinct breed, succeeded by hybrid courts and the International Crim-
inal Court.127 The tribunals nonetheless offer important lessons for the
design of future transitional justice mechanisms.
B. Hybrid Courts
The label "hybrid courts" sweeps in a variety of institutions, sharing
the common feature of mixed national and international elements, in-
cluding mixed legal frameworks and staff. These tribunals, located in the
country in which the mass violence occurred, include the War Crimes
Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Serious Crimes Panels in East
Timor, the Regulation 64 Panels in the Courts of Kosovo, the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 28 In the
words of one observer, "The aim is to marry the best of two worlds-the
expertise of the international community with the legitimacy of local
actors; but the risk is to intermix the worst of both-the externality of
international actors with the weakness of local institutions that produced
125. ORENTLICHER & OPEN Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 39 (citing
interview with Goran Svilanovic).
126. Id. at 68.
127. James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribu-
nals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 616-17 (2005).
128. James Cockayne, Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes Trials as
Unsuccessful Degradation Ceremonies, 4 J. HUM. RTS. 455, 455 (2005) [hereinafter Cock-
ayne, Hybrid or Mongrels]; Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local
Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 347,
353-54 (2006) (describing the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal as a "partial hybrid"); Sarah
Nouwen, "Hybrid Courts": The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes
Courts, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 190, 192 (2006). Because no quantitative or qualitative studies of
population preferences relating to the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herze-
govina or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have been conducted to date, this Article does not
discuss those tribunals. For discussions of local reactions to these courts, see generally BOG-
DAN IVANISEVIC, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: FROM HYBRID TO DOMESTIC COURT (2008), http://www.ictj.org/
images/content/1/0/1088.pdf; Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar & Lynn Maalouf, Early Reflec-
tions on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy, and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1065 (2007).
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the violence in question." 2 9 In practice, hybrid courts have often faced
serious criticism from local populations. 30
The quantitative and qualitative surveys relating to hybrid courts
present concerns common to these tribunals. Local populations have
negative perceptions of hybrid courts for several reasons: they have not
been included in the process of creating the court; local moral authorities
are either explicitly excluded or omitted from the decisionmaking of the
court; the complex legal concepts and structures are inaccessible to the
vast majority of the population; and locals are disappointed with the
scope and pace of the court processes. Those creating the courts have
failed to bring even natural allies, such as lawyers and some elites, into
the fold by excluding them from the process of creating and staffing the
courts. As a result, like the ad hoc tribunals, hybrid courts are subject to
capture by political elites who can, and often do, play these courts to
their advantage."' This turn of events further damages perceptions of
impartiality of hybrid courts. This is not to say that local populations
entirely reject hybrid courts; the case studies below lay out the positive
aspects of these courts alongside the criticisms. However, this investiga-




The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in the Dili Courts and the
Serious Crimes Unit in Timor-Leste present perhaps the most
spectacular example of the failures of hybrid courts from the perspective
of local populations.'33 The Serious Crimes process was established in
129. Cockayne, supra note 127, at 619. See also Suzannah Linton, New Approaches to
International Justice in Cambodia and East Timor, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 93, 113-19
(2002) (discussing "lessons learned" from hybrid tribunals in Cambodia and Timor-Leste).
130. Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 71, at 159; Baylis, Reassessing, supra note
101, at 19; Higonnet, supra note 128, at 410.
131. Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 16, at 827-31.
132. William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J.
53, 66-67 (2008) [hereinafter Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity].
133. The origins of these courts can be seen in the U.N. Transitional Admin. in East
Timor, Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East Timor, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (Mar. 6, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/
Regll.pdf (establishing the courts effective June 2000); U.N. Transitional Admin. in East
Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction
over Serious Criminal Offences, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000), available
at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/RegOO15E.pdf. Although the Special Crimes Unit
was separate from the Special Panels, preference surveys often discuss the two processes to-
gether. See, e.g., CAITLIN REIGER & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, THE SERIOUS CRIMES PROCESS IN TIMOR-LESTE: IN RETROSPECT 13 (2006),
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2000 to account for the violent acts committed by advocates of
integration with Indonesia during East Timor's transition to
independence in 1999.'" The Timorese people had serious concerns
relating to the scope and mandate of the court, expressing frustration
with its focus on low-level perpetrators' and its failure to prosecute
crimes committed before 1999.36 Perhaps more importantly, one of the
key concerns of the victims-the need to locate missing persons-was
not addressed by the court.17 These shortfalls were compounded by the
court's failures in performing adequate outreach to affected
communities.3 9
At least some of those who had survived the atrocities would have
preferred that the Serious Crimes process incorporate local dispute reso-
lution traditions.'" According to a qualitative survey, most Timorese
respondents generally accepted the authority of traditional leaders, in
part because they believed that these leaders had performed well.140
Many of those interviewed thought that traditional leaders and custom-
ary law should be included in the justice system.141 Moreover, the
processes offered by the court did not speak to approaches traditionally
favored by the Timorese. For example, public apology is extremely im-
portant in resolving disputes in Timor-Leste; this step would have been
simple to include in the court process but was not.142
Interviewees offered the idea that, in accord with Timorese culture
and traditions, the victim should decide how the reconciliation process
should proceed.143 So, for example, one interviewee suggested that in-
stead of being fed and housed in prison-an outcome that led to some
http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Timor.study.pdf. Therefore, this Article refers to both
with the term "Serious Crimes process."
134. U.N., East Timor- UNTAET Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
pastletimor/UntaetB.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
135. PIERS PIGOU, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, CRYING WITHOUT TRARS: IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN TIMOR-LESTE-COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES
AND EXPECTATIONs 34 (Paul Seils ed., 2003), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/096.pdf
(reporting on an interviewee who noted the importance of reinforcing the principle that the
law applies to everyone); REIGER & WIERDA, supra note 133, at 32; Rapoza, supra note 56, at
528.
136. REIGER & WIERDA, supra note 133, at 32.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 31.
139. PIGOU, supra note 135, at v, 35 (recounting responses from twelve focus group
discussions "involving eighty-two people in six of the country's thirteen districts" and noting
many participants felt "Timorese culture and traditions" should form a basis for restorative
justice).
140. Id. at 31-32.
141. Id. at 30-32 (reporting that interviewees believed that only issues that could not be
handled by traditional leaders could then be referred to the formal justice system).
142. Id. at 36.
143. Id. (arguing that compensation should depend on the victim's family's needs).
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resentment on the part of victims who struggled to meet these basic
needs--convicted perpetrators should have to grow food for victims or
rebuild houses they had burned down.'" Rather than the abstract idea of
punishing perpetrators on behalf of the entire community, interviewees
expected a more direct exchange between perpetrators and victims, with
the perpetrator telling victims and families what they knew about the
atrocities, and providing compensation in the form of a feast with vic-
tims' families and the public so that the perpetrator could be accepted
back into the community.145
Local desires to see high-level perpetrators brought to justice were
also frustrated by the government's prioritization of political considera-
tions.'" Because the Timorese authorities viewed better relations with
Indonesia as an important political goal, they preferred not to seek for-
mal justice for the atrocities of 1999, as such efforts might alienate the
Indonesian government.147 As a result, Timor-Leste's leadership began to
obstruct the Serious Crimes process. 48 1in a striking illustration of this
phenomenon, just over a year after the Special Panels indicted Indone-
sian General Wiranto, Timorese President Gusmdo met publicly with
Wiranto, demonstrating his lack of support for prosecutions of senior
Indonesian officials. 49 While such political obstacles may be difficult for
any transitional justice mechanism to overcome, a better-designed insti-
tution might have prevented the Timorese government from directing the
process away from the preferences of local populations.
In short, the Serious Crimes process was plagued by design flaws,
leading to frustration and disillusionment on the part of local popula-
tions. To be fair, the serious funding and resource constraints faced by
the court undoubtedly contributed to its institutional weakness. 50 How-
ever, a transitional justice mechanism more carefully tailored to the
preferences of the Timorese populace might have been more successful
in achieving legitimacy despite these obstacles.
144. Id. at 35.
145. Id.
146. Rapoza, supra note 56, at 530.
147. MEGAN HIRST & HOWARD VARNEY, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, JUS-
TICE ABANDONED? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SERIOUS CRIMES PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR 25-26
(2005), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/2/121.pdf (noting that the absence of political
support from the United Nations also played a role in undermining the Serious Crimes proc-
ess); REIGER & WIERDA, supra note 133, at 32.
148. REIGER & WIERDA, supra note 133, at 33.
149. Id. at 32-33.
150. Id. at 26-30.
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2. Kosovo
In 2000, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kos-
ovo (UNMIK) created the Regulation 64 Panels in the Kosovar court
system to respond to Kosovar Serb criticisms of bias and lack of inde-
pendence of the judiciary responsible for trying war crimes."' Under
Regulation 64, a majority panel of international judges may be assigned
to a war crimes case at the request of the prosecutor, defense counsel, or
UNMIK's Department of Judicial Affairs. Since their inception, the Pan-
els have heard more than two dozen war crimes cases.'52 Similar to
Timor-Leste's Serious Crimes process, the Regulation 64 Panels have
suffered from a serious resource deficit.' As a result of UNMIK's hap-
hazard approach to justice, the Panels demonstrate serious design flaws.
UNMIK's failure to involve the affected population in its decision to
create the Panels led to negative perceptions on the part of the general
populace and the political elites.'54 Even before the creation of the Regu-
lation 64 Panels, UNMIK made a serious misstep by applying Serbian
criminal codes from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the legal sys-
tem in Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians viewed this as the imposition of
enemy law and objected vociferously."' While this problem was resolved
prior to the enactment of Regulation 64,156 lingering resentment toward
UNMIK on the part of the local judiciary remained.' With this negative
151. U.N. Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo, Regulation No. 2000/64 on Assignment of
International Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/64
(Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg64-OO.htm.
152. INTEGRATED REG'L INFO. NETWORKS, IN-DEPTH: JUSTICE FOR A LAWLESS WORLD?
RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION IN A NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (PART II) 41 (2006),
http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-deptlRightsAndReconciliationPart2.pdf.
153. For a thorough discussion of the complexities and challenges of Kosovo's courts,
see Elena A. Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2007).
154. Wendy S. Betts, Scott N. Carlson & Gregory Gisvold, The Post-Conflict Transi-
tional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary
and the Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 372 (2001) (citing a lack of legitimacy and
local involvement).
155. Brooks, supra note 60, at 2291-92.
156. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Kosovo JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 6-7 (2000),
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PCAAB112.pdf (describing how the United Na-
tions Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) initially regulated to continue
application of Serbian criminal codes, generating "widespread opposition" from leaders and
judges, a regulation it later repealed).
157. See Brooks, supra note 60, at 2292-93 (describing the initial insult to Kosovars and
the rejection by judges and prosecutors to apply "Serb law" as regulated by UNMIK, a regula-
tion which had consequences, even following its repeal); Int'l Crisis Grp. Balkans, Starting
From Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon Is Over, at 11-13, I.C.G. Balkans Rep. No. 83 (Dec.
10, 1999), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/europe/Kosovo%
2016.ashx (noting that rampant cynicism regarding UNMIK's "involvement in and commit-
ment to establishing a viable legal system for Kosovo" can be traced back to a series of
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backdrop, UNMIK then failed to explain to local judges, politicians, or
the general public the rationale behind Regulation 64 before it was
promulgated.' As a result, the ethnic Albanian community rejected
UNMIK's proposal to create the court. Local judges refused to be re-
cruited for the Regulation 64 Panels.' 9 The Kosovo Supreme Court went
so far as to send a letter to the United Nations stating that Regulation 64
was a violation of international law.'" All of these pitfalls might have
been avoided had the design process included representatives of the local
population.
It is perhaps unsurprising that these poorly designed panels were not
able to overcome substantial local resistance to war crimes trials for
members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Many Albanians per-
ceived members of the KLA as heroes carrying out a "just war."'6'
According to a survey on perceptions of transitional justice conducted in
the spring of 2007, seventy-eight percent of Kosovar Albanians denied
that members of their ethnicity were responsible for war crimes.6 2 As a
result, locals viewed the Regulation 64 Panels as biased, arguing that
they did not prosecute all Serbs and handed down light sentences to
those prosecuted, while convicting and awarding severe punishments to
Albanians.' These perceptions extended even to some Albanian judges,
who became angry and rebellious when the Panels' retrials of genocide
and war crimes cases against Serbs led to acquittals.'6 This situation ex-
emplifies the complexity of norm reconstruction; as discussed above, a
group that views itself as victims may include perpetrators but may be
unwilling to acknowledge that fact. The Regulation 64 Panels undoubt-
edly faced a difficult audience, but a better-designed process might have
been more successful in persuading Albanians to accept that the KLA
committed war crimes. Apart from including local populations in the
necessary "ad hoc decisions" by UNMIK in attempt to address a post-conflict legal situation
for Kosovo).
158. David Marshall & Shelley Inglis, The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based
Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 95, 130 (2003).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Int'l Crisis Grp. Balkans, Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo, at
21-22, I.C.G. Balkans Rep. No. 134 (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
-/media/Files/europe/Kosovo%2032.ashx.
162. U. N. DEV. PROGRAMME, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 16
(2007), available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/transitional-justicefeng.pdf
(reporting on a survey of a demographic, geographic, and ethnically representative random
sample of 1250 Kosovars in 61 locations between April and May 2007).
163. Tom PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
LESSONS FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN Kosovo
31 (2006), http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Kosovo.study.pdf [hereinafter PERRIELLO &
WIERDA, LESSONS FROM DEPLOYMENT].
164. See Int'l Crisis Grp. Balkans, supra note 161, at 20-21.
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design of the court, UNMIK could have performed more substantial
outreach to the local populations.'65 The outreach failures with respect to
the Regulation 64 Panels were so severe that as late as 2007, fifty per-
cent of Kosovars surveyed in the poll described above did not have
knowledge of the Panels' work."
Like the Special Crimes process in Timor-Leste, the Regulation 64
Panels faced serious human resource and infrastructure constraints.
While these obstacles account for some of the failures of these hybrid
courts, a more carefully crafted mechanism might have overcome many
of the problems described above. Efforts to include locals and their
viewpoints in the creation of the court might have ameliorated negative
perceptions, particularly on the part of natural allies such as Albanian
judges. A more locally grounded court might have been more successful
at convincing both sides to the conflict to accept responsibility for war
crimes, thereby making more long-lasting contributions to peace.
3. Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court), responsible for
investigating atrocities committed in the course of that country's civil
war, has been hailed as a model for other hybrid courts to emulate.'67
These positive impressions stem largely from its successes in the arena
of procedural fairness. 6 ' However, the court has been criticized as a
"'spaceship phenomenon,' i.e., a court that is perceived as a curiosity
and an anomaly with little impact on citizens' everyday lives."'69 Sierra
Leoneans' negative views of the Special Court might have been amelio-
165. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, LESSONS FROM DEPLOYMENT, supra note 163, at 30.
166. U. N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 162, at 17.
167. Established in January 2002 through an agreement between the United Nations and
the Sierra Leone Government, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court) focuses on
crimes committed after November 30, 1996. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 6,
2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, app. II,
U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (Mar. 8, 2002). See also Special Court Agreement, 2002 (Ratification)
Act, CXXXIII SIERRA LEONE GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 22, available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=BcKTbFltxZk%3d&tabid=176; U.N. Sec. Council, Statute of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3dda29f94.html.
168. ANToNIO CASSESE, REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 65 (2006),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VTDHyrHasLc=&tabid=176
("[The court] is dispensing fair justice in a manner visible to the local population."); Tom
PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 2 (2006), http://www.ictj.org/static/
Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf [hereinafter PERRIELLO & WIERDA, UNDER SCRUTINY]
("[T]rials are generally considered to meet international standards .... The same is true for
conditions of detention.").
169. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, UNDER SCRUTINY, supra note 168, at 2.
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rated had it incorporated local perspectives and cultural traditions in its
design process.
Although ninety-six percent of respondents in a 2007 survey of local
perceptions indicated their awareness of the Special Court, depth of un-
derstanding was poor-ninety-three percent reported that they knew only
a little about the court.o This should perhaps come as no surprise in a
country with a relatively low literacy rate, 7 ' particularly given com-
plaints about the lack of access to information about the court.
7 2 While
most of those surveyed who knew of the Special Court had positive per-
ceptions of it (sixty-eight percent) and believed in its ability to bring
justice (seventy-six percent), the lack of knowledge about the court puts
the validity of these findings into question.173
A qualitative study performed in 2007 uncovered significantly more
negative perceptions of the Special Court. 174 Many Sierra Leoneans in-
terviewed felt "disconnected with the Court," because it "had not
included them from the beginning and [the people] did not feel a part of
the process."'7 5 Therefore, they were "not interested in working with [the
Court] at this late stage."'7 6 "What's so special about the Special Court?"
was a common refrain. Some individuals criticized the Special Court
as existing to try "big men" using "white man's law,"'
78 while victims
were more focused on satisfying basic needs such as housing, food, jobs,
education, and health.'"9 Indeed, many locals were resentful that defen-
dants before the court were held in jails that provided free food, shelter,
and security, while victims struggled to eke out a subsistence wage."
0
There was also hostility to the great cost of the Special Court, which led to
170. BBC WORLD SERV. TRUST AND SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, BUILDING A BET-
TER TOMORROw: A SURVEY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
IN SIERRA LEONE 19-20 (2008) (surveying a random sample of 1,717 adults across nine dis-
tricts in Sierra Leone in June and July 2007).
171. Cent. Intelligence Agency, Sierra Leone: People, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.govlibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html (last updated Aug.
19, 2010) (reporting that Sierra Leone had an estimated 65% illiteracy rate in 2004).
172. RACHEL KERR & JESSICA LINCOLN, WAR CRIMES RESEARCH GRP., KING'S COLL.
DEP'T OF WAR STUDIES, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: OUTREACH, LEGACY AND
IMPACT, FINAL REPORT 15 (2008), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/04/9
5 /6 0/
SCSLOutreachLegacyandlmpactFinalReport.pdf.
173. BBC WORLD SERv. TRUST AND SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, supra note 170, at
20.
174. KERR & LINCOLN, supra note 172, at 7 (describing focus groups and semi-
structured interviews with court staff, representatives of civil society groups, and key stake-
holders in six locations in Sierra Leone).




179. Id. at 15, 23.
180. See id. at 23.
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a feeling of exclusion for ordinary people-a feeling that the court was not
for them.'8 In addition to these concerns, Sierra Leoneans voiced discon-
tent with the small number of individuals tried, as well as impatience with
the length of trials, in that those seen as most responsible for the mass vio-
lence had died or gone missing by the time of the trials.'
Because of its failure to include Sierra Leoneans in the design proc-
ess, the Special Court failed to win support even among natural allies.
The legal community, for example, had expected that half of the court's
jobs would go to nationals and were sorely disappointed when they did
not.' In addition, many Sierra Leonean lawyers would have preferred
that the massive funds expended on the court be channeled into rebuild-
ing the domestic legal system." Moreover, the Special Court's failures
of outreach to counter misinformation led to largely hostile domestic
media coverage, which reported unfair trials and ill-treatment of detain-
ees.' These stories may have been fueled by the view of some Sierra
Leoneans that some defendants (the CDF, or Civil Defense Forces) were
liberators and war heroes who deserved to be celebrated, not indicted.' 6
Capitalizing on, and further contributing to, the Special Court's failure to
respond to local preferences, defendants boycotted their trials in pro-
test.87
The Special Court also failed to incorporate or even respect local
moral authorities. For example, juju, a form of sorcery, plays a continued
role in dispute resolution in Sierra Leone.' 8 This traditional practice fig-
ured largely in the trials of the Civil Defense Forces, a government
militia whose structures and practices were strongly influenced by juju.
The prosecution explicitly repudiated these traditions, describing them
as "cultish"-a move that risked alienating the local community, who
might, as a result, reject the court's narrative.'89 A more sophisticated
approach would have accepted the legitimacy of these traditions while
criticizing aspects that violate fundamental human rights.'"o
While an initial assessment of the available data might view the Spe-
cial Court as well-respected among locals, the qualitative study reveals
181. See id. at 21. These feelings of marginalization improved with the creation of a
dedicated outreach system staffed solely by Sierra Leoneans, though this section was isolated
from the rest of the court for that reason. Id.
182. Id. at 20; STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 294 (noting that many Sierra Leone-
ans have expressed frustration that lower-level offenders are not being held accountable).
183. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, UNDER SCRUTINY, supra note 168, at 38.
184. Id.
185. See KERR & LINCOLN, supra note 172, at 15, 17.
186. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, UNDER SCRUTINY, supra note 168, at 38.
187. See Cockayne, Hybrids or Mongrels, supra note 128, at 467.
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significantly negative attitudes toward the court. The serious critiques of
the court raised by all of the local stakeholders give rise to the concern
that its accountability efforts may not take root in the society it was cre-
ated to serve. A transitional justice mechanism that took the preferences
and traditions of Sierra Leoneans into account from the start might have
contributed to a more deeply internalized sense of justice and a longer-
lasting peace.
4. Cambodia
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
were created in 2003 through an agreement between the Cambodian
Government and the United Nations 9' and began its work in 2006.192 The
ECCC seeks justice for serious crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge
regime between 1975 and 1979, during which time an estimated 1.7 mil-
lion Cambodians are said to have perished.' 3 While initial perceptions of
the ECCC have been positive, Cambodians' lack of knowledge about the
court suggests that the foundation of these impressions may be shaky.'94
The tribunal does not comport with Cambodian preferences in important
ways, a state of affairs that opens the door to legitimacy problems.
The first scientifically representative comprehensive population-
based survey of Cambodians' attitudes toward accountability for the
Khmer Rouge was performed in 2008, two years after the ECCC began
191. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period
of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117; Law on the Establishment of
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Oct. 27, 2004, as amended (Cambodia), Reach
Kram No. NS/RKM/1004/006, available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR Law as
amended 27 Oct 2004 Eng.pdf [hereinafter Law on the ECCC] (unofficial translation by the
Council of Jurists and the Secretariat of the Task Force, revised Aug. 26, 2007).
192. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, News: National and Interna-
tional Co-Prosecutors begin their work at ECCC (July 10, 2006), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
english/news.view.aspx?doc-id=20.
193. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Oct.
27, 2004; U.N. Group of Experts on Cambodia, Rep., transmitted by identical letters dated
Mar. 15, 1999 from the U.N. Secretary-General concerning the Group of Experts for Cambo-
dia established pursuant to resolution 52/135 (1997) addressed to the President of the General
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, 1 35, U.N. Does. A/53/850, S/1999/231
(Mar. 16, 1999).
194. A poll conducted in the summer of 2009 found that 70% of Cambodians believed
that the trial of Khmer Rouge leaders was providing justice. INT'L REPUBLICAN INST. &
USAID, SURVEY OF CAMBODIAN PUBLIC OPINION: JULY 31 - AUGUST 26, 2009, at 2, 34
(2010) (analyzing face-to-face interviews of a representative sample of 1,600 Cambodian
adults).
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functioning and nearly thirty years after the Khmer Rouge left power.'
The results of the survey highlight the challenges inherent in determin-
ing the accountability preferences of populations with little exposure to
the rule of law or the idea of a court. 96 While eighty-seven percent of
respondents thought that the ECCC should "be involved in responding to
what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime[]" eighty-five percent
of respondents had no or limited knowledge of the ECCC.9 7 Even as-
suming that all of the fifteen percent of respondents who had more than
limited knowledge of the ECCC were part of the former group of re-
spondents (those who thought the ECCC should be involved in
accountability), eighty-three percent of those who expressed a preference
for the ECCC had little understanding of what the court actually does.
Nearly half of those surveyed (forty-nine percent) said that the Khmer
Rouge perpetrators should be put on trial, yet forty-three percent defined
justice as establishing the truth-and only fourteen percent thought trials
195. PHUONG PHAM ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, So WE
WILL NEVER FORGET: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 9-11
(2009), available at http://hrc.berkeley.edu/pdfs/So-We-Will-Never-Forget.pdf [hereinafter
PHAM ET AL., NEVER FORGET] (describing the face-to-face structured survey of a random
sample of 1,000 Cambodian adults, drawn through a "four-stage cluster sampling strategy" to
ensure representativeness, from September 9 through October 1, 2008). For earlier non-
scientifically representative surveys, see William W. Burke-White, Preferences Matter:
Conversations with Cambodians on the Prosecution of the Khmer Rouge Leadership, in
BRINGING THE KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE
CAMBODIAN COURTS 97 (Jaya Ramji & Beth Van Schaack eds., 2005) (describing a qualitative
survey); SUZANNAH LINTON, RECONCILIATION IN CAMBODIA (Documentation Ctr. of
Cambodia 2004) (describing a survey of readers of Searching for the Truth magazine); Jaya
Ramji, Reclaiming Cambodian History: The Case for a Truth Commission, 24 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 137 (2000) (describing a qualitative survey); Khmer Inst. of Democracy, Survey
on the Khmer Rouge Regime and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 2004, http://www.bigpond.
com.kh/users/kid/KRG-Tribunal.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (describing a survey of
Khmer Rouge survivors). See also VICTIM AND WITNESS PROJECT, KHMER INST. FOR
DEMOCRACY, OUTREACH SURVEY ON KNOWLEDGE AND INTEREST IN THE ECCC (2008)
(summarizing a survey of participants in project outreach sessions); Laura McGrew,
Transitional Justice Approaches in Cambodia, JUST. INITIATIVES, Spring 2006, at 139,
142, available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focuslintemational-justice/articles-
publications/publications/justice_- 20060421/jinitiatives 200604.pdf (analyzing existing studies
and surveys related to justice in Cambodia).
196. Memorandum from Tara Urs, Open Soc'y Justice Initiative, on Outreach Strategies
for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 21 (Nov. 2006) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Urs, Memorandum].
197. PHAM ET AL., NEVER FORGET, supra note 195, at 36-37, 39. 83% of interviewees
thought that the economy, jobs, and poverty were their top priorities. See id. at 45. The 87%
figure comports with a survey conducted earlier that year which found that 69% of respon-
dents very much agreed with a trial for top Khmer Rouge leaders and 17% somewhat agreed.
INT'L REPUBLICAN INST. & USAID, SURVEY OF CAMBODIAN PUBLIC OPINION: JANUARY 27-
FEBRUARY 26, 2008, at 44.
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would be an appropriate mechanism to establish the truth.'98 These find-
ings might point to the need for a truth commission alongside a tribunal,
but in any case suggest that trials alone may not respond to the prefer-
ences of Cambodians and may lead to disappointment with the ECCC
process.
The survey results point to further problems inherent in applying
Western-style criminal justice in Cambodia. Interviewees viewed the
Cambodian court system as corrupt and, as a result, may have been more
likely to seek conflict resolution through their village chief or commune
council. 200 These dispute resolution processes resemble mediation more
than litigation and often contain religious elements.20' In addition, many
respondents believed that justice is largely about revealing the truth, a
task that the ECCC may not perform effectively.202 While the tribunal
may establish certain narrow legal facts, Cambodians have repeatedly
stated their interest in knowing facts beyond the legal record, such as the
role of other nations and foreigners in perpetrating or supporting the
atrocities.203 Finally, the structure of the tribunal is complicated and its
proceedings and opinions hard to understand for a population that is nei-
ther highly literate nor well-versed in Western-style criminal
proceedings.99
A deeper problem is the distance between Cambodian moral authori-
ties and the legal proceedings before the ECCC. Ninety-four percent of
those surveyed considered themselves Buddhists.205 According to experts
on Theravada Buddhism as well as Cambodian Buddhist monks, it is
important to Cambodians to have a culturally relevant source of recon-
ciliation.99 Law may not fit this bill because it is widely viewed as too
198. PHAM ET AL., NEVER FORGET, supra note 195, at 27, 32-33. 45% of interviewees
said that they did not know which mechanisms would be appropriate to establish the truth. Id.
at 27.
199. See Ramji, supra note 195, at 137 (arguing for a trial of top leaders and a truth
commission for other Khmer Rouge cadre).
200. PHAM ET AL., NEVER FORGET, supra note 195, at 33-34.
201. Tara Urs, Imagining Locally-Motivated Accountability for Mass Atrocities: Voices
from Cambodia, 7 SUR - INT'L J. ON HUM. RTS. 61, 67 (2007) [hereinafter Urs, Accountabil-
ity]; Urs, Memorandum, supra note 196, at 36-39.
202. PHAM ET AL., NEVER FORGET, supra note 195, at 33.
203. Urs, Accountability, supra note 201, at 73-75. See Ramji, supra note 195, at 145.
204. Urs, Accountability, supra note 201, at 69-70.
205. PHAM ET AL., NEVER FORGET, supra note 195, at 29.
206. Ian Harris, "Onslaught on Beings": A Theravada Buddhist Perspective on Account-
ability for Crimes Committed in the Democratic Kampuchea Period, in BRINGING THE KHMER
ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CAMBODIAN COURTS, supra
note 195, at 59, 80-82. See The Venerable Yos Huot Khemacaro, Buddha's Teachings and a
Tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, 13 ON THE RECORD, Aug. 1, 2000, at http://
www.advocacynet.org/resource/421; Heng Monychenda, Buddhism, Justice, and Reconcilia-
tion, 13 ON THE RECORD, Aug. 1, 2000, http://www.advocacynet.org/resource/421.
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closely tied to politics. 207 Moreover, Buddhist conceptions of justice seek
to harmonize the parties, thereby rectifying the relationship between the
individual and the Dhamma, or cosmic law of existence.208 Viewing indi-
vidual conscience as central, the Buddhist approach emphasizes the
education and rehabilitation of offenders. 209 In concrete terms, Buddhism
might ask that the perpetrators confess their crimes and take responsibility
for their actions. 21 0 From a Buddhist perspective, it might even be impor-
tant to punish dead perpetrators, given Theravada Buddhist beliefs that
"punishments and consequences can carry over between lives [and] that
spirits take a corporal form and can be encountered roaming the earth."211
It is not hard to see why many Cambodians might not view the proceed-
ings before the ECCC as relevant to their lives.
The failure to ground the ECCC in Cambodian culture has enabled
the Cambodian government to play the court to its political advantage. 21 2
Beginning even before the ECCC was created, the process has been pla-
gued by ongoing and repeated accusations of corruption and political
interference. While efforts have been made recently to address these
concerns, it will be difficult to resuscitate entirely the court's credibil-
207. See Harris, supra note 206. See also Monychenda, supra note 206 (criticizing
apologies made by Khmer Rouge leaders as too political and not sufficiently Buddhist in ap-
proach).
208. Harris, supra note 206, at 81, 85. See Khemacaro, supra note 206; Monychenda,
supra note 206.
209. Harris, supra note 206, at 70. See Khemacaro, supra note 206; Monychenda, supra
note 206.
210. Harris, supra note 206, at 86.
211. Urs, Accountability, supra note 201, at 72-73 (recounting interviews that suggested
how to undertake such punishments, such as "digging up the bodies of the dead perpetrators,
putting chains around their bones, and re-burying them .. . [,] hanging their pictures in a jail[,]
or building a statue of the leaders with their hands cuffed to display in a public place. For
some, [these actions] would require that the spirit remain in a kind of purgatory creating an
equivalent to punishment in this life.").
212. Burke-White, Community of Courts, supra note 100, at 36 ("[B]oth the efforts to-
ward and delays in creating a Khmer Rouge tribunal play directly into the hands of the
Cambodian government.").
213. Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Cambodia: Submission to the Universal
Periodic Review of the U.N. Human Rights Council, 6th Session: Nov. 30-Dec. 11, 2009,
at 2-3 (Apr. 14, 2009); OPEN Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES AT
THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 7-10 (2007); OPEN Soc'Y
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 81 at 2; Jaya Ramji-Nogales,
Corruption in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, INTLAWGRRLS (Feb. 23, 2007, 1:40 PM), http://
intlawgrrls.blogspot.con2007/02/corruption-in-khmer-rouge-tribunal.html. See Dinah
PoKempner, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Criticisms and Concerns, JUST. INITIATIVES,
Spring 2006, at 32, 34-35, available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/
intemational-justice/articles-publications/publications/justice 20060421/jinitiatives_20060
4.pdf; Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Hybrid Mess in Cambodia, INTLAwGRRLS, (June 11, 2010, 5:16
AM), available at http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/06/hybrid-mess-in-cambodia.htnml.
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ity.2 14 Again, a bespoke process might have overcome some of these ob-
stacles. For example, a transitional justice mechanism that looked to
Cambodia's Buddhist monkhood for its moral authority rather than to its
government might have resonated more deeply with the local population
and been better able to withstand corrupting influences. As it stands, de-
fendants before the court have presented concerns of corruption and
political influence to openly question the authority of the ECCC.2 5
The ECCC does offer one design innovation worth mentioning. It is
the first internationalized criminal court to allow victims to participate as
civil parties, which may increase the responsiveness of this mechanism
to local preferences.216 However, the ECCC could have had a more sig-
nificant impact on the Cambodian populace and may have been better
able to withstand political meddling had it incorporated local preferences
into the design process from the beginning.
C. The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created by the Rome
Statute in July 2002.217 Despite great expectations of ending impunity for
international crimes, the ICC's limited jurisdiction and resources mean
that in practice its reach will be far more modest.218 The majority of
states negotiating the Rome Statute did not favor a powerful court with
unlimited reach; instead, they wanted to retain power to prosecute crimes
committed on their own territory or by their own nationals. 21 9 As a result,
several scholars have suggested that the main purpose of the court will
be to spur and complement national prosecutions of grave crimes.220
214. OPEN Soc'Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 81, at 2.
215. See, e.g., French Lawyer Warned by Cambodia's Court, MACAU DAILY TIMES,
May 22, 2009, available at http://www.macaudailytimesnews.com/index.php?option=com
content&task=view&id=27683&Itemid=32.
216. Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, supra note 213 at 4; Susana SaCouto, The Role of
Victims in Bringing Former Khmer Rouge Leaders to Justice in Cambodia, JUST. INITIATIVES,
Spring 2006, at 60, 62, available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/
internationaljustice/articles publications/justice 2006042 1/jinitiatives 200604.pdf.
217. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 1, 3, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
218. Burke-White, Community of Courts, supra note 100, at 5-11; Burke-White, Proac-
tive Complementarity, supra note 132, at 66-77; Turner, Criminal Law, supra note 101, at 3-
9, 12-13.
219. Turner, Criminal Law, supra note 101, at 5-6.
220. Id. at 3-9, 12-13; Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity, supra note 132; Bay-
lis, Reassessing, supra note 101.
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Thus far, the court has issued indictments relating to four conflicts: 2 1
the Central African Republic,222 the Democratic Republic of Congo,223
Darfur,224 and Northern Uganda. 225 Local populations have registered dis-
content with various aspects of the court's approach to justice, including
perceived political bias and lack of responsiveness to local preferences.226
While some of these concerns might be alleviated by a more careful
prosecutorial strategy, they point again to a serious design flaw-the in-
stitution is designed to favor prosecution over approaches that might be
more precisely tailored to address the unique cultural context of each
situation.
The great discretion awarded to the prosecutor in deciding which
cases to pursue might itself be viewed as a design flaw. Affected popula-
tions, including political elites, have charged the ICC with political bias
due to its selective prosecution strategy. Although three of the current
cases were self-referred (by the respective countries' governments) to the
ICC,227 there are widespread complaints that the court has focused only
221. In March 2010, the court authorized the prosecutor to investigate the communal
violence in Kenya following the December 2007 elections. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Deci-
sion Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into
the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II (Mar.
31, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf. At the time of this
writing, no indictments had been issued relating to this situation, and a comprehensive survey
of Kenyan perceptions of the investigation had not been conducted. As a result, this Article
does not discuss the Kenya situation. Also at the time of this writing, the Office of the Prose-
cutor had publicly announced that it was conducting a preliminary analysis of six additional
situations: Afghanistan, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guinea, and Palestine. Rep. of the
ICC, U.N. Doc. A/64/356; GAOR, 64th Sess. (Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 ICC Report];
Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, OTP Delegation to Visit Guinea, U.N. Press
Release ICC-OTP-20100518-PR525 (May 18, 2010). Because no decision had been taken as
to whether to open an investigation in those situations, this Article does not discuss these
situations.
222. Rep. of the ICC, 44, U.N. Doc. A/63/323; GAOR, 63d Sess. (Aug. 22, 2008)
[hereinafter 2008 ICC Report].
223. ICC, Situations and Cases: Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104 (last vis-
ited Oct. 10, 2010); 2008 ICC Report, supra note 222, 17.
224. 2008 ICC Report, supra note 222, 33; S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593
(Mar. 31, 2005).
225. 2008 ICC Report, supra note 222, 23.
226. This Article does not discuss the Central African Republic indictment because there
is no publicly available survey of the preferences of the local population. It is not a good sign
that the ICC's outreach efforts began five months after the investigation was opened, and the
court's first survey of the perceptions of local populations was not scheduled for another year.
See HRW, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT'S FIRST
FIVE YEARS 127-30 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
icc0708l.pdf [hereinafter HRW, COURTING HIsTORY].
227. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Press Release ICC-OTP-20040419-50
(Apr. 19, 2004); Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral
44 [Vol. 32:1
Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice
on African defendants." Some suggest that the ICC has been designed
to impose Western justice and rights norms on African perpetrators be-
cause African countries are believed to be politically and economically
weak.229 This criticism has even seeped into the courtroom, with defense
lawyers such as Jacques Verges taking great delight in pointing out that
genocides perpetrated by European nations are not prosecuted, while
African leaders are consistently in the dock at the ICC.210 Whether or not
these criticisms are supported by the facts, they must be taken seriously,
as the potential damage to perceptions of the court could be severe.
1. Darfur
The Darfur case is an investigation of serious crimes committed by
the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Janjaweed Militia against civilians
in northern Sudan between August 2003 and March 2004.23 In Darfur,
both the local population and the political elites have criticized the ICC's
approach to justice. Among the local population, anecdotal evidence
suggests that widespread misperceptions about the ICC's mandate, in-
cluding beliefs that the court would bring peacekeepers to Darfur, led to
deep disappointment.23 ' The dampened expectations of those who held
those beliefs have surely contributed to negative attitudes about the
court. These concerns might have been alleviated through a more inclu-
sive design process or a more thorough outreach strategy.
The court has also stepped on the feet of local and regional political
elites, as exemplified by the diplomatic kerfuffle over the arrest warrant
Concerning Central African Republic, U.N. Press Release ICC-OTP-20050107-86 (Jan. 7,
2005); Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, President of Uganda Refers Situation
Concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, U.N. Press Release ICC-CPI-
20040129-43 (Jan. 29, 2004).
228. Robert Marquand, African Backlash Against International Court Rises, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR GLOBAL NEWS BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Global-News/2009/1006/african-backlash-against-international-courts-rises ("African lawyers,
scholars, and human rights advocates at an international bar association meeting here in Ma-
drid say that concerns of anti-African bias, are rising.").
229. HRW, COURTING HISTORY, supra note 226, at 44; Q&A: The ICC and Sudan,
INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (July 14, 2008), http://www.ictj.org/en/news/
features/I 848.html.
230. Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 31.
231. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant
of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, at 4 (Apr. 27, 2007).
232. HRW, COURTING HISTORY, supra note 226, at 128-29.
233. It may be unclear to the reader what a more inclusive design project would look like
in the case of the ICC. In this case, the inclusion of local preferences in the prosecution and
outreach strategy might have led to more realistic beliefs about the capabilities of the court.
Alternatively, as described further in Section V, below, a more inclusive design process might
have resulted in the use of an entirely different accountability mechanism to address atrocities
in Darfur.
45Fall 2010]1
Michigan Journal of International Law
issued for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir. When the ICC prosecutor
applied to the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir
in July 2008,234 the African Union made a request to the U.N. Security
Council, in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, to defer the
ICC process to prevent jeopardizing the peace process in Darfur.23 5 That
same month, the African Union's Peace and Security Council requested
the creation of a High-Level Panel of experts to investigate the situation
in Darfur and submit recommendations on accountability and peace.236
The Pre-Trial chamber issued an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir in March
2009,237 two weeks before the African Union Panel was inaugurated. 238
The African Union responded by issuing a formal decision that its mem-
ber states would not cooperate with the execution of Al-Bashir's arrest
warrant.239 It has since rejected the ICC's request to open a liaison office
to the African Union in Ethiopia.24 Whether or not there were unsavory
political motives behind these refusals, the ICC's failure to incorporate
the views of a major international organization involved in the peace
process seems a serious diplomatic error.
The African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur issued its report in
October 2009, providing anecdotal evidence that Darfurians and other
Sudanese prized peace above other goals and shared a preference for an
inclusive and localized peace process.241 The Panel found "polarized
opinions" on the ICC, with some Sudanese repudiating it as an illegiti-
mate intervention, and others, particularly those displaced in Darfur,
242welcoming the prosecutions. In response to these mixed preferences,
234. Press Release, ICC, ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President,
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur,
U.N. Press Release ICC-OTP-20080714-PR341 (July 14, 2008).
235. African Union, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in
Darfur, 4, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/2(CXCVIII) (July 21, 2009) [hereinafter A.U., Rep. on Dar-
fur].
236. Id. 16.
237. Press Release, ICC, ICC Issues a Warrant of Arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of
Sudan, U.N. Press Release ICC-CPI-20090304-PR394 (Mar. 4, 2009).
238. A.U., Rep. on Darfur, supra note 235, 17.
239. African Union, Decisions on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 10, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) (July 3,
2009).
240. Press Release, African Union, Decisions of the 15th AU Summit, A.U. Press Re-
lease 104 (July 29, 2010).
241. African Union, Peace and Sec. Council, Report of the African Union High-Level
Panel on Darfur (AUPD), 1 1, 128-29, 136(vii), 137, A.U. Doc. PSC/AHG/2(CCVII) (Oct.
29, 2009) [hereinafter AUPD Report] (making findings based on meetings with 2,700 people
in Darfur and 400 people in Khartoum).
242. Id. 240. The second part of this finding is confirmed by a randomized survey of
2,152 Darfurian refugees in eastern Chad, 98% of whom thought that President Bashir should
be tried before the ICC. 24 HOURS FOR DARFUR, DARFURIAN VOICEs: DOCUMENTING DARFU-
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the Panel recommended the creation of a hybrid court constituted by the
African Union to prosecute the most serious crimes, strengthen the do-
mestic institutions created to deal with crimes committed in Darfur, and
establish a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission' 3 Though it
does not thoroughly assess the preferences of the Sudanese people, the
Panel's suggestion of a transitional justice approach crafted inclusively
around local interests might have presented a more effective route to ac-
countability for Darfur.
2. The Democratic Republic of Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) case centers largely on
the use of child soldiers in the country's civil war.2" Empirical data point
to serious problems with the prosecutorial approach in this case.4 Local
perceptions of the ICC in the DRC range from lack of knowledge of the
court to serious objections raised by those who are aware of its exis-
tence. It is an understatement to say that the court is not well known
among the population it purports to serve; in 2007, only twenty-seven
percent of those surveyed in the Eastern part of the DRC had heard of
the ICC.24 Locals familiar with the court have expressed a preference for
a locally based accountability mechanism and objected to the ICC's per-
ceived political bias.
The ICC's decision to indict Congolese leaders was not responsive
to local preferences concerning accountability. A population survey con-
ducted in the Eastern DRC in 2007 revealed that forty-four percent of
respondents selected peace, and twenty-eight percent chose security as
their highest priority, while only three percent viewed justice for those
24
responsible for mass crimes as of paramount importance. Of those sur-
veyed in the Eastern DRC, over eighty percent thought the local
government could bring durable peace to the region, while fewer than a
quarter thought the international community could.248 Though a large ma-
jority of those interviewed (eighty-five percent) wanted to see
RIAN REFUGEES' VIEWS ON ISSUES OF PEACE, JUSTICE, AND RECONCILIATION 29 (2010),
available at http://darfurianvoices.org.
243. AUPD Report, supra note 241, 25.
244. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges," [ 1, 64 (Jan. 29, 2007).
245. PATRICK VINCK ET AL., LIVING WITH FEAR: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON
ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO 15-18 (2008), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=hrc (reporting on a cross-sectional structured face-to-
face survey of 2,620 people in Eastern DRC and 1,133 people in Kinshasa and Kisangani,
which are removed from the conflict).
246. Id. at 47.
247. Id. at 23-24.
248. Id. at 23-24.
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accountability to secure the peace, nearly as many (eighty percent)
viewed this as a job for the national government2 9 Over half wanted tri-
als to be conducted by national courts, while just more than a quarter
favored trials held by the ICC.250 Even more strikingly, eighty-five per-
cent of those surveyed wanted trials-whether national or
internationalized-to be held in the DRC.251 Though the DRC cases were
referred to the court by President Joseph Kabila, the ICC should have
considered local preferences before proceeding with its indictment.
With this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that the court's selec-
tive prosecution strategy has been criticized by local populations in the
DRC. The prosecutor's decision to indict very few defendants with select
charges has led to perceptions of political interference.252 For example,
the ICC's decision to indict Thomas Lubanga for using child soldiers
was popularly viewed as a "highly selective prosecution of a single mid-
level defendant for a crime ... that virtually all participants in the
conflict committed and that many view as relatively minor in the face of
other extensive and widespread atrocities."253 This led to speculation and
rumors that only Lubanga was arrested because he killed white people
(United Nations peacekeepers).254 Again, the failure to include local pref-
erences in the design process (in this case, prosecutorial strategy) risks
local rejection of the entire enterprise.
The Lubanga case also offers anecdotal evidence about the differ-
ence between legal and social legitimacy, and the impact of focusing on
the former rather than the latter in designing transitional justice mecha-
nisms. When the ICC investigation opened, there were reports that some
militant groups warned their troops not to attack civilians or commit
human rights violations. 25  After Lubanga's transfer to the Hague, other
militia leaders expressed fear of arrest and said that they did not want to
end up like Lubanga.256 While a first read of this story might support the
prosecutor's strategy, further details lead to doubts as to whether the
norms promulgated by the ICC were internalized. After Lubanga was
249. Id. at 4(-42.
250. Id. at 45.
251. Id. at 46.
252. Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 101, at 50-51. These perceptions of unfairness may
not be too far off the mark; the ICC prosecutor has been criticized for his failure to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence in the Lubanga case. 2008 ICC Report, supra note 222, 1 9.
See also Yvonne McDermott, Abuse of Process & The ICC Trial in Lubanga, INTLAwGRRLS
(Aug. 4, 2010, 4:59 AM), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2010/08/abuse-of-process-icc-trial-
in-lubanga.html.
253. Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 101, at 21.
254. HRW, COURTING HISTORY, supra note 226, at 127-28.
255. Id. at 67.
256. LAURA DAVIS & PRISCILLA HAYNER, DIFFICULT PEACE, LIMITED JUSTICE: TEN
YEARS OF PEACEMAKING IN THE DRC 30-32 (Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice 2009).
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charged, militia leaders who used to admit the number of children in
their ranks and hand them over to the United Nations as part of the de-
mobilization process denied having any child soldiers, hiding some and
abandoning others; another tactic was to brief child soldiers to claim that
they were older than they actually were.2" In addition, child protection
workers reported threats by armed group leaders following Lubanga's
arrest.
3. Northern Uganda
The Northern Uganda case concerns serious crimes, including forcible
recruitment of child soldiers, committed by the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) against the government of Uganda, the Ugandan Army, and Ugan-
dan civilians since as early as 1987.259 The ICC has faced hostility in
Uganda due to its failure to respond to the preferences of local popula-
tions.2 60 According to a population survey conducted in 2007, while
seventy-one percent of those who were familiar with the ICC thought that
it had helped to reduce violence by bringing the LRA into peace talks,
most (seventy-six percent) thought that the pursuit of trials now could en-
danger the peace process.26' And although nearly sixty percent of the
Ugandans surveyed wanted trials for leaders of the LRA (presumably at
a later date), a similar number thought traditional mechanisms were
needed to deal with the situation in Northern Uganda.262 Acholi leaders in
particular preferred traditional measures of reconciliation and worried that
indictments could threaten the peace process.263 Local NGOs and interna-
tional humanitarian organizations in northern Uganda also promoted
257. Id.
258. HRW, COURTING HISTORY, supra note 226, at 68-69.
259. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Indictment, 1 5 (Sep. 27,
2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf.
260. HRW, COURTING HISTORY, supra note 226, at 127.
261. PHUONG PHAM ET AL., WHEN THE WAR ENDS: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON
ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA 5,
10-13 (2007), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/8/8/884.pdf [hereinafter PHAM ET AL.,
WHEN THE WAR ENDS] (reporting on a face-to-face structured survey of 2,875 individuals in
thirty-eight locations from April to June 2007). Moreover, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
has said that it will not sign a final peace agreement unless warrants are withdrawn. Alexander
K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 117 (2009).
262. PHAM ET AL., WHEN THE WAR ENDS, supra note 261, at 34-35, 40-41 (reporting
that 59% of those surveyed wanted trials for the LRA leaders). However, when asked which
mechanisms would be the most appropriate to deal with the LRA and the Uganda People's
Defense Force responsible for human rights violations, only 3% mentioned traditional jus-
tice-perhaps because it was viewed as a process rather than a mechanism. Id. at 34.
263. LYDIAH BOSIRE, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, OVERPROMISED, UNDER-
DELIVERED: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 12 (2006), http://www.ictj.org/
static/Africa/Subsahara/AfricaTJ3.pdf.
49Fall 2010]
Michigan Journal of International Law
localized, non-punitive solutions such as the Mato Oput ("bitter root")
ceremony.'" Moreover, while the idea of trials was popular, over half of
those surveyed believed that the focus should be on forgiveness and rec-
onciliation for leaders of the LRA, and nearly eighty percent wanted to
forgive and reintegrate rank-and-file LRA members.6 In addition,
Ugandans surveyed demonstrated a very high emphasis on understand-
ing the cause of conflict (ninety-three percent) and establishing a written
historical record (ninety-five percent), two tasks that trials are not
well-suited to perform.6 6These survey results reveal a serious disjunc-
ture between the ICC's indictment and the Ugandan cultural context.
This gap, which may lead to local rejection of the court's decision, could
have been avoided by a transitional justice mechanism that paid greater
heed to the preferences of local populations.
D. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
When seeking an alternative or a complement to internationalized
criminal courts, scholars most commonly turn toward truth and reconcilia-
tion commissions (TRCs) as the preferred transitional justice
mechanism. 67 Truth commissions are temporary, officially sanctioned
bodies that investigate a pattern of past abuses over time.2 68 Approximately
thirty truth commissions have been convened to date. These transitional
justice mechanisms have become so prevalent that "it is difficult to conjure
an example of a political or post-conflict transition (since the 1990s) in
which the idea of establishing a truth commission has been overlooked."2 69
While there are many situations of mass violence for which a truth com-
264. To be fair, others expressed concerns that traditional leaders lack legitimacy, that
traditional ceremonies fall short of human rights standards, and that these approaches may
perpetuate the exclusion of women and youth. PHAM ET AL., WHEN THE WAR ENDS, supra
note 261, at 17.
265. Id. at 34-35.
266. Id. at 31-32.
267. MARK FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 11 (2006)
("[T]he truth commission has become a preferred fixture of international law and politics
alongside international and hybrid criminal tribunals."); PRISCrLLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE
TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 14 (2001) ("It is partly due to the lim-
ited reach of the courts, and partly out of a recognition that even successful prosecutions do
not resolve the conflict and pain associated with abuses, that transitional authorities have in-
creasingly turned to official truth-seeking as a central component in their strategy to respond
to past atrocities."); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 57, 65 (1998) ("[L]imitations in our knowl-
edge of societal healing make [the question of whether truth commissions are preferable to
prosecutions] a line of future inquiry rather than a current conclusion.").
268. HAYNER, supra note 267, at 14-15.
269. FREEMAN, supra note 267, at 11, 318-25.
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mission may be an appropriate option,270 the proliferation of this form of
transitional justice in recent years gives rise to at least two concerns.
First, whereas truth commissions are viewed as more responsive to local
preferences than internationalized criminal courts, this impression may
21,
not always bear out in practice. Moreover, a thorough investigation of
the past may not be culturally or otherwise appropriate for a society re-
covering from mass violence.
The South African TRC, held out by many as a model of the form,
has been criticized by participants for its narrow and stripped-down view
of the "truth."272 Victims who had been deposed for the TRC reported
that they could not say everything they wanted to say and were not al-
lowed to formulate their own request for reparations.
273 The TRC's
statement forms and data processing did not provide space for victims to
discuss relationships and other subjectivities that might have given
greater meaning, from their perspective, to their personal histories.
274
Even within a society, "truth" does not have a shared meaning. While
overall perceptions of the TRC were positive,275 a process that included
as many visions of the truth as possible might have been more successful
in reconstructing social norms.
Sierra Leone's TRC highlights concerns about the universal appro-
priateness of truth commissions.276 A 2006 survey of residents of the
capital of Sierra Leone found that while nearly sixty percent of respon-
dents thought the TRC facilitated reconciliation, only forty-four percent
of respondents believed that people had a positive attitude toward the
270. See generally, HAYNER, supra note 267, at 24-31 (focusing on the truth commis-
sion's goals and purposes).
271. For a critique of some truth commissions' failure to uncover the entire truth, see
Gregory L. Smith, Immune to Truth? Latin American Truth Commissions and U.S. Support for
Abusive Regimes, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 241 (2001).
272. RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 48-49 (2001) (basing conclusions on
ethnographies of over fifty victims of political violence in townships south of Johannesburg
between 1995 and 1998).
273. Id. at 49 (using the example of a mother who wanted to see the police cell where
her son allegedly hanged himself while detained for his political activities).
274. Id. at 49-50, 60.
275. Gunnar Theissen, Object of Trust and Hatred: Public Attitudes Toward the TRC, in
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: DID THE TRC DELIVER? 191, 197 (Audrey
R. Chapman & Hugo Van Der Merwe eds., 2008) (citing a 1998 Human Science Research
Council Poll that found a positive response from 57% of those surveyed in response to the
question of whether they think that the truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) has been a
good or a bad thing for the country).
276. The Truth Commission was established in July 2002 by the authority of the Lome
Peace Agreement and The Truth and Reconciliation Act of 2000. SIERRA LEONE TRUTH &
RECONCILIATION COMM'N, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (VOL. 1) 24 (2004), available at http://reliefweb.int/rw/
rwb.nsf/db900sid/EVOD-73HJHY/$File/full-report.pdf.
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TRC.277 Half believed that the procedures adopted by the TRC were not
satisfactory.278 All of these respondents were concerned that only those in
big towns had the opportunity to view the proceedings, and some be-
lieved that the perpetrators should have been made to apologize to the
victims.279 These numbers do not describe a completely ineffective transi-
tional justice mechanism, but they do give rise to questions of whether
and how truth commission design processes could be improved.280
Truth telling related to mass violence may have been inappropriate
in the Sierra Leonean cultural context. Sierra Leoneans have a long his-
tory of "reintegrating combatants, reworking relationships, and
rebuilding moral communities," and practice social forgetting as a me-
chanism used to "cool the heart" and reestablish the community.28' Sierra
Leoneans thus refuse to reproduce the violence by discussing it publicly,
except during a process of containing and "unmaking" the past through
ritual confessions.282 Although chiefs and ritual leaders are allowed to
present oral memory of atrocities, they do so only after they invoke the
2813protection of ancestors. Instead of discussing the violence, people turn
to social and ritual practices, including sacrifices, prayer, and ritual heal-
ing. The TRC may have disrupted these local reconciliation practices in
its quest for universal truth telling.2 4 Even if it did not harm local ac-
countability efforts, the TRC may not have been responsive to the
preferences of the many Sierra Leoneans who prioritized peace and re-
building over truth telling. 285 A more carefully tailored design process
might have recognized these potential obstacles in advance, enabling the
creation of a transitional justice mechanism that fit the local cultural con-
text more neatly.
Truth commissions are particularly dependent on the voluntary par-
ticipation of perpetrators. If those responsible for mass violence do not
277. AMADU SESAY, DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL? THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECON-
CILIATION COMMISSION REVISITED 8, 37, 42 (2007) (reporting on a semi-structured survey of a
random sample of residents of Freetown, Sierra Leone, from January to February 2006, sup-
plemented by focus group discussions).
278. Id. at 36.
279. Id. at 37.
280. Id.
281. Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons From
Sierra Leone, SPECIAL REP. FOR THE U.S. INST. OF PEACE, Feb. 2005, at 9, available at
http://www.usip.org/resources/rethinking-truth-and-reconciliation-commissions-iessons-
sierra-leone [hereinafter Shaw, Rethinking TRCJ.
282. Id. at 9; Rosalind Shaw, Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Sierra Leone, I INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 183, 195 (2007) [hereinafter
Shaw, Memory Frictions].
283. Shaw, Memory Frictions, supra note 282, at 195 n.49.
284. Shaw, Rethinking TRC, supra note 281, at 7-9.
285. See Shaw, Memory Frictions, supra note 282, at 202.
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take the truth commission process seriously, it will be difficult to paint a
full picture of the atrocities and their causes. Perhaps more importantly,
without acknowledgement of the past by perpetrators, it will be signifi-
cantly more difficult for societies to move forward toward
reconciliation.2 36 The South African TRC addressed this problem by in-
corporating the threat of prosecution against those who failed to tell all
they knew about the past, and providing amnesty for those who did
speak the full truth.287 After criminal investigations were commenced,
numerous perpetrators came forward and spoke to the TRC.288 In con-
trast, key war actors before Liberia's TRC repeatedly denied knowledge
of, and responsibility for, atrocities committed during the country's civil
war. 28 9 The Liberian perpetrators did not take the process seriously, per-
haps in part because the threat of prosecution was not imminent and in
part because the truth commission was not culturally relevant.290 As dis-
cussed further below, an accountability mechanism grounded in local
moral authority might have held greater sway over perpetrators, render-
ing denials of their actions more difficult.29 1
Truth commissions, like other transitional justice mechanisms, have
flaws and strengths that make them appropriate for some societies recov-
ering from mass violence and inappropriate for others.292 This Article
seeks to encourage thoughtful design of transitional justice mechanisms.
Rather than assuming that truth commissions are always beneficial or
should always be accompanied by prosecutions, accountability for mass
violence should be bespoke.
286. HAYNER, supra note 267, at 163-64.
287. JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED
NATION? 6 (2006); HAYNER, supra note 267, at 98-99; WILSON, supra note 272, at 23.
288. HAYNER, supra note 267, at 99-100.
289. Press Release, Truth and Reconciliation Comm'n of Liberia, Roland Duo Joins
Chorus of Denials ... Denies Allegations of Murders, Rapes, and Tortures (Dec. 8, 2008),
available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/roland-duo-joins-chorus-of-
denials-denies-allegations-of-murders-rapes-and-tortures.
290. The TRC shall grant immunity to all persons or groups of persons, organizations, or
institutions from prosecution or tort actions on account of statements made or evidence given
before the TRC in advancement of the public interest objective inherent in the functions and
objects of the TRC and pursuant to the successful execution of its mandate, and which there-
fore shall not be used in any court of law against the person making the statement. Truth and
Reconciliation Comm'n of Liberia, Mandate, § 30 (2005), https://www.trcofliberia.org/about/
trc-mandate. See also Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Truth Without Teeth, INTLAWGRRLs BLOG (Dec.
19, 2008, 7:00 AM), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2008/12/truth-without-teeth.html.
291. Of course, lack of cooperation by the accused is a common problem in domestic
trials as well, and a certain level of perpetrator denial is to be expected. This Article does not
argue that this problem can be eliminated, only that it can be minimized through more
thoughtful transitional justice mechanism design.
292. Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 71, at 157-58 (discussing the limitations of
truth commissions).
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E. Locally Grounded Accountability Processes
Moving one step closer to the preferences of the affected population,
locally grounded accountability processes rely on traditional dispute res-
olution mechanisms to address extraordinary crimes. As a general rule,
these transitional justice efforts tend to meet with great support within
local populations, who find the processes familiar and relevant. These
mechanisms are far from perfect, however. Concerns have been raised
primarily over local mechanisms' due process gaps and risks of replicat-
ing broader social inequality.293 Moreover, these local accountability
efforts may pose risks of political capture similar or greater to those
faced by hybrid courts.294
1. Rwanda
The gacaca courts in Rwanda are perhaps the best-known and most
controversial example of a locally grounded accountability mechanism
used to address mass violence. Gacaca is an informal civil dispute reso-
lution process for resolving property, inheritance, personal injury, and
marital relations claims between family or neighbors.2 95 The gacaca
process is closer to mediation than litigation and begins with all parties
to a dispute meeting with witnesses and local leadership to discuss the
problem. A solution is then proposed by the group; if it is not acceptable
to the parties, they can then take their dispute to court.296 After holding a
series of meetings with leaders to discuss the political transition,9 the
Rwandan government decided to formalize gacaca as a transitional jus-
tice mechanism, extending its jurisdiction to address crimes committed
293. Id. at 161; Fionnuala Ni Aolain & Michael Hamilton, Gender and the Rule of Law
in Transitional Societies, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 380, 392-94 (2009); Patricia Lundy & Mark
McGovern, The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE FROM BELOW: GRASSROOTs ACTIVISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE, supra note
2, at 99, 112 (discussing mechanisms generally, not simply local mechanisms); Ellen Lutz,
Transitional Justice: Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 325, 335; Men-
kel-Meadow, Restorative Justice, supra note 10, at 171; Elizabeth Stanley, The Political
Economy of Transitional Justice in Timor-Leste, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW:
GRASSROOTs ACTIVISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE, supra note 2, at 167, 185.
294. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transi-
tional Justice, 79 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) ("[W]hat passes for harmonious, indigenous
customs are more often than not 'invented traditions' designed to promote social control and
political ideologies.").
295. Urusaro Alice Karekezi, Alphonse Nshimiyimana & Beth Mutamba, Localizing
Justice: Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE
AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 69, 73; Timothy
Longman, Justice at the Grassmots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 206, 209.
296. Karekezi et al., supra note 295, at 73.
297. Longman, supra note 295, at 210.
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before and during the genocide (though serious crimes such as genocide
and rape are dealt with by regular courts) .21' The process remains locally
grounded and retains its emphasis on social reconciliation. 299 Although
some observers decry the transformation of gacaca into a transitional
justice mechanism, labeling it a top-down imposition by an authoritarian
regime,3 W others are more generous, lauding gacaca's innovative judicial
syncretism and plural objectives while noting that they may give rise to
stubborn clashes between formal and informal justice.30
Initially, this locally grounded accountability process was wildly
popular with the Rwandan population. According to a survey performed
in February 2002, before the gacaca trials began, over eighty percent of
the population had a positive attitude toward gacaca." Once implemen-
tation began, however, observers noted that the participation of
perpetrators and bystanders was much lower than expected.os This was
in part because many Rwandans were so desperate to meet their subsis-
tence needs in a devastated society that they did not have time to attend
hearings.' One observer notes anecdotally that survivors were generally
not happy with gacaca, describing the pain of watching perpetrators ei-
ther stonewall or confess without remorse, but could not imagine a better
solution.' In the words of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, "[N]obody
will tell you he is happy with the gacaca," neither victims nor perpetra-
tors, but it gives Rwanda "something to build on."
The gacaca process has faced far more serious critiques related to
the competence of gacaca judges, the impartiality and independence of
the courts, and perhaps most strongly, the procedural due process rights
298. The gacaca courts were created by Rwanda's Transitional National Assembly on
October 12, 2000. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001 Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions
and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes
Against Humanity Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, available at
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Law.pdf.
299. Karekezi et al., supra note 295, at 74.
300. Waldorf, supra note 294, at 65.
301. Karekezi et al., supra note 295, at 293.
302. Longman et al., supra note Ill, at 215-17 (reporting the results of a structured
face-to-face survey of 2,091 representative Rwandans selected through a cluster sample in
four communes in February 2002).
303. See Karekezi et al., supra note 295, at 79, 82 (reporting on an observational study
of gacaca in the Gishanvu Sector from October 2001 through June 2002).
304. Lars Waldorf, "Like Jews Waiting for Jesus": Posthumous Justice in Post-Genocide
Rwanda, in LOCALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: INTERVENTIONS AND PRIORITIES AFrER
MASS VIOLENCE 183, 190, 190 n.24 (Rosalind Shaw & Lars Waldorf with Pierre Hazan eds.,
2010).
305. Philip Gourevitch, The Life After: Fifteen Years After the Genocide in Rwanda, the
Reconciliation Defies Expectations, THE NEW YORKER, May 4, 2009, at 37, 42.
306. Id. at 43.
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of defendants.30 Although some of these criticisms may themselves be
critiqued for being excessively tied to a narrow conception of procedural
justice, anecdotal reports of corrupt judges and intimidated witnesses are
far more troubling and more difficult to dismiss.308 In short, gacaca paints
a picture of the potential strengths and pitfalls of locally grounded ac-
countability. It provides a reminder not to fetishize local justice as a
perfect transitional justice mechanism-as with every other form of
accountability detailed above, this approach has its shortcomings-while
encouraging flexibility in definitions of due process. *
2. Timor-Leste
In contrast with the gacaca courts, Timor-Leste's Community Rec-
onciliation Process (CRP) was viewed as a great success by Timorese
society for its role in maintaining peace in communities and settling past
conflicts.1 o Between thirty thousand and forty thousand community
members attended or participated in CRP hearings, far exceeding origi-
nal expectations and indicating great community support for the
process.3"' As with all transitional justice mechanisms, the CRP had mul-
tiple shortcomings, but it also offers an example of the value of
surveying the preferences of local populations and of thorough integra-
tion of traditional systems of justice into an accountability effort.
The process of creating the CRP began in 2000, when a committee
composed of representatives of Timorese groups, assisted by the United
Nations, undertook consultations with communities in each of East Ti-
mor's thirteen districts.3 2 These surveys found that the population
wanted to see trials for those most responsible for atrocities but commu-
307. AMNESTY INT'L, INDEX No. AFR 47/007/2002, RWANDA: GACACA: A QUESTION OF
JUSTICE 34-40 (2002), available at http://www.amnesty.orglenlibrary/infolAFR47/007/
2002/en; Longman, supra note 295, at 213-19.
308. See Lucy Hovil, A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda 29-31 (Int'l
Refugee Rights Initiative, Refugee Law Project & Soc. Sci. Research Council, Working Paper
No. 4, 2010), available at http://www.refugeelawproject.org/others/10 06_28_A_Dangerous.
Impasse,RwandanRefugees-inUganda.pdf; Gourevitch, supra note 305, at 39 (reporting on
a 2005 trial run of the gacacas).
309. See Longman, supra note 295, at 223; Lundy & McGovern, supra note 293, at 112.
310. Comm'n for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor, Chega! Final
Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor (Part 9),
EAST TIMOR & INDONESIA ACTION NETWORK, Oct. 31, 2005, at 3, 33-34, available at
http://www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm [hereinafter Chega!] (noting that 96% of 156 the
Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) participants, including deponents, victims, and
community members, surveyed said that the CRP had achieved its primary goal of promoting
reconciliation in their community). See Patrick Burgess, A New Approach to Restorative Jus-
tice-East Timor's Community Reconciliation Processes, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 176, 186-87.
311. Burgess, supra note 310, at 187.
312. Id. at 182-83.
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nity justice for those involved in less serious crimes. It was important to
the Timorese that the transitional justice process include traditional sys-
tems of justice."' From this mandate, the CRP was created along with
other transitional justice mechanisms, including the Serious Crimes
process described above.3 4
The CRP's focus on the needs of victims was a central reason for its
success."' One aspect of this victim centeredness was the informality of
the process. 16 Victims were not limited by the formal requirements of
court testimony; in contrast, they were allowed to express their feelings
openly, which enabled greater emotional catharsis. Victims could also
more directly participate in the hearings and impact the fate of perpetra-
tors.1 Unlike in the courtroom, victims in CRP hearings were "afforded
a place of honour" and did not have to endure the process alone."' In-
stead, the CRP allowed them to be accompanied by family, friends, or
support staff from the truth commission."' Many participants com-
mented on the importance of the location of the CRP hearings.320
Because these hearings were held in their home community, victims and
community members were able to participate fully in the hearings and
did not confront the "economic, logistical, and psychological obstacles"
faced in accessing the courtroom.3 21
The CRP also involved traditional leaders and customary law.
Because the Timorese viewed the criminal justice system as corrupt and
313. Id. at 183; PIGOU, supra note 135, at 30-31.
314. The CRP was created as part of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Recon-
ciliation of East Timor. U. N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Regulation No. 2001/10 on
the Establishment of a Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation for East Timor,
U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/10 (July 13, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/peace/
etimor/untaetR/ReglOe.pdf.
315. See Chega!, supra note 310, at 44. Several groups surveyed by the International
Center for Transitional Justice emphasized the importance of a victim-centered consultative
process. PiGou, supra note 135, at 38.
316. The CRP proceeded as follows: perpetrators voluntarily came forward to make
statements concerning their participation in crimes; these statements were forwarded to the
Office of General Prosecutor, which decided whether to send each perpetrator to the CRP or to
prosecute them; perpetrators sent to the CRP were to admit their wrongs before their commu-
nity at a public hearing into which traditional practices were incorporated; the community
then decided what the perpetrator needed to do to be accepted back into the fold; if the perpe-
trator fulfilled this duty, he would be granted immunity from prosecution. Burgess, supra note
310, at 184. At this time, a Community Reconciliation Agreement would be registered with
the appropriate District Court. JUDICIAL Sys. MONITORING PROGRAMME, supra note 71, at 11.
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controlled by politics,3 22 the CRP drew on other sources of moral
authority, such as local traditions, grassroots leadership, national leaders,
and the Catholic Church.323 The CRP incorporated East Timorese
customary dispute resolution practices, which include a process of
meeting and discussion in order to seek consensus between opposing
parties. At the end of these meetings, the CRP assisted in holding
reconciliation ceremonies "drawing on customary East Timorese law and
practice." This often involved chewing of betel nut, sacrificing a chicken
or pig, a rolling up of the biti (mat), and a celebratory feast."325 Many
Timorese could not afford to perform these traditions in the wake of the
war, and felt indebted to the CRP for providing the necessary funds.326
This deep grounding in Timorese culture and moral authority likely
contributed to the highly positive local perceptions of the CRP.
Even some of those who participated in the CRP as defendants re-
327ported that the process positively impacted their lives. Many of those
responsible for crimes wanted to be involved in the CRP, because they
were worried about future discrimination against their children and did
not want community problems to be "passed down to future genera-
tions."328 After testifying about their crimes, defendants said that they felt
"freer" when they walked around the community because others were no
longer suspicious of them.3 29 These examples come with the caveat that
not all perpetrators participated, and that many victims believed that the
CRP was appropriate only for those responsible for lesser crimes.3 30 Still,
it provides a reminder of the complexities of situations of mass violence,
and the position of many perpetrators who may have committed crimes
under duress and even view themselves as victims. It is crucial to incor-
porate these defendants into reconciliation processes in a way that
maximizes their participation and belief in the system.
As with all transitional justice mechanisms, the CRP program was
not without its flaws. The informal nature of the institution led to due
322. Burgess, supra note 310, at 189 (referring to the corruption and political control of
the justice system under the Portuguese colonial administration and Indonesian military occu-
pation).
323. Id. at 202-03.
324. JUDICIAL SYs. MONITORING PROGRAMME, supra note 71, at 5-7, 9 (reporting on
semi-structured interviews of ninety participants, deponents, and victims in CRP hearings
conducted in five of East Timor's fourteen districts between February and May 2004).
325. Id. at 11.
326. See, e.g., id. at 13 (providing one individual's story that the CRP provided the nec-
essary funds for a traditional dispute resolution ceremony).
327. Id. at 12.
328. Id. at 12-13.
329. Id. at 12.
330. Id. at 40.
58 [Vol. 32:1
Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice
process concerns related to the statements made by defendants.33 De-
spite successes in engaging victims and perpetrators, problems of
participation and closure persisted. Both victims and deponents ex-
pressed concerns with the failure of those most responsible at the village
level to participate in the CRP.33 2 Many Timorese were satisfied with the
process only to the "extent that it was matched by a serious crimes proc-
ess."3' In other words, many victims could accept the fact that low-level
offenders would be immune from prosecution only because those who
had perpetrated serious crimes, such as murder or rape, would be prose-
cuted and sentenced to prison." In addition, some deponents felt that
closure had not been achieved; their communities were still suspicious of
their involvement in crimes that they claim not to have committed, or
failed to reintegrate them after their participation in the CRP.'" Some
victims who had suffered serious crimes also had concerns about clo-
sure, as they did not feel that their harms had been fully addressed.33 6
Finally, though the participation of female commissioners and Panel
members may have helped to promote gender equality,3 7 the CRP hear-
ings still tended to be dominated by men, a situation that may have
reinforced existing gender inequalities.338
The case studies above highlight shared flaws of the international-
ized criminal courts: a failure to engage sufficiently with local
populations, ranging from exclusion of locals from the process of creat-
ing the court to exclusion of local legal experts in the court staff; a
failure to adapt to the local cultural context, particularly by excluding
local moral authorities; a failure to respond to local preferences about
331. Burgess, supra note 310, at 194-96.
332. Id. at 196-97. See JUDICIAL Sys. MONITORING PROGRAMME, supra note 71, at 15-
16.
333. HIRST & VARNEY, supra note 147, at 15. See JUDICIAL Sys. MONITORING PRO-
GRAMME, supra note 71, at 21-22.
334. HIRST & VARNEY, supra note 147, at 15. See JUDICIAL Sys. MONITORING PRO-
GRAMME, supra note 71, at 21-22.
335. JUDICIAL Sys. MONITORING PROGRAMME, supra note 71, at 14.
336. Id. at 20 (referring to victims of multiple crimes or crimes involving multiple perpe-
trators, not necessarily victims of serious crimes).
337. Id. at 37-38.
338. Id. at 38-39. In addition, Kevin Jon Heller notes that lisan, the traditional legal
system on which the CRP relied, has troubling gender dimensions, as it often requires that a
rapist marry his victim. Heller argues that the use of CRP strengthened this traditional system
and increased the likelihood of harm to women; however, it is also likely that the incorpora-
tion of women into the CRP process might enable their future participation in dismantling
gender-subordinating aspects of lisan. Kevin Jon Heller, Deconstructing International Crimi-
nal Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 975, 987-88 (2008).
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the importance of accountability as compared to other reconstruction
goals; insufficient outreach to locals, leading to a lack of knowledge of
the courts, unrealistic expectations, and perceived political bias; and cul-
tural and geographic inaccessibility of the institution. A combination of
several of these factors has enabled political capture of several of these
courts by those who use the court to their political advantage, an out-
come often at odds with institutional goals. On the other end of the
spectrum, truth commissions have also at times failed to incorporate lo-
cal culture, and their lack of enforcement capability may make them
undesirable in certain situations. Locally grounded accountability proc-
esses have at times faced serious procedural fairness and equality
concerns, as well as limited participation because of financial and emo-
tional constraints. Some populations expressed support for local
processes only when matched with trials for those most responsible for
mass violence.
The existing toolkit of transitional justice mechanisms offers a spec-
trum of choices for societies seeking to overcome mass violence, and
undoubtedly many more innovative approaches can be imagined.3 '9 Each
option carries benefits and pitfalls. Some are more adept at meeting fair-
ness concerns, while others step away from narrower conceptions of
procedural justice and speak more eloquently to local populations. These
mechanisms may be used in conjunction with one another, each offering
solutions that respond to different population preferences.340 Some have
suggested that the Bosnian public might become more engaged in the
work of the ICTY through a truth commission.341 But multiple mecha-
nisms have pitfalls of their own, as their roles can be confused or even at
odds with each other. For example, in Sierra Leone, some interviewees
suggested that perpetrators before the TRC did not tell the truth because
they feared prosecution by the Special Court, which was simultaneously
in existence.3 42 In short, the options must be thought through carefully
and rigorously in designing a transitional justice mechanism appropri-
343ately tailored to the societies they seek to serve.
339. See Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein, Conclusion: A Common Objective, a Uni-
verse of Alternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND THE AFTERMATH OF MASS
ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 323, 323-41. See, e.g., MANI, supra note 1, at 87-125.
340. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 2, at 256.
341. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 124, at 102-05 (describing "Bridging the Gap" and
other outreach efforts).
342. SESAY, supra note 277, at 38.
343. Thoms et al., supra note 2, at 9 (noting that policymakers tend to promote a stan-
dardized menu of transitional justice options).
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IV. CRAFTING LEGITIMACY
Future transitional justice mechanisms should be crafted with a fo-
cus on increasing perceptions of legitimacy so that their findings are
widely internalized. 3" As discussed above, perceptions of legitimacy of a
rule or institution may derive from the source from which it has been
constituted, the procedure by which it has been adopted, or the substance
of the rule itself." This Section suggests three principles to increase le-
gitimacy along each of these axes and then offers methods that can be
used to structure responsive transitional justice mechanisms.
A. Principles
Contemporary transitional justice mechanisms can increase legiti-
macy across three axes: the source of their authority, the procedure by
which they are created, and the substance of the norms they promulgate.
In order to strengthen the legitimacy of the source of their authority,
these institutions should affirm norms opposing mass violence that are
endogenous rather than exogenous to the affected society. This reliance
on indigenous authority will help to "reconnect offenders to an aware-
ness of their own social values and to their stake in maintaining social
relationships."'6 A mechanism grounded in the local source is much
more likely to be effective at reconstructing social norms than one that
relies on external sources of authority. Legitimacy exists when the pro-
cedures of authority systems accord with cultural values; systems that
fail to conform to cultural values will likely face serious obstacles to
compliance and deference.3"' Moreover, people are more likely to accept
judgments from authorities who represent a society with which they
identify, a finding that points to the importance of incorporating local
moral authorities into transitional justice mechanisms.4
In order to increase the legitimacy of their constitutive procedure,
the design processes for these mechanisms should be participatory and
inclusive. This procedural approach will be the most likely to increase
344. This is not to say that the aims of general deterrence and retribution disappear en-
tirely; in fact, a transitional justice mechanism that is perceived as legitimate by both victims
and perpetrators will likely meet these goals as well, as discussed below.
345. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
346. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 31, at 346 (discussing the goals of domestic
community policing in the United States).
347. Tom R. Tyler et al., Cultural Values and Authority Relations, PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y,
& L. 1138, 1153 (2000).
348. Tyler, Multiculturalism, supra note 57, at 983 (relating only to compliance with the
law, which may not be the optimal transitional justice medium in all societies).
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legitimacy by offering all players a stake in the institution4 9 Victims of
the atrocities should play a role in designing the transitional justice me-
chanism to increase its legitimacy in their eyes and to enable victims to
reclaim their place in society.so While the victims' preferences should be
paramount, perpetrators should not be marginalized from the process and
should perceive that their perspective is taken into account as far as pos-
sible. So, for example, an accountability mechanism might examine the
broader and more complex political, historical, and economic factors that
set the stage for the atrocities, and delve into atrocities committed by all
parties, not only the perpetrators who lost the conflict."' The viewpoint
of political elites within a society should also be valued in designing a
transitional justice mechanism and incorporated where possible. Ideally,
a transitional justice mechanism would indicate that preferences of each
of the players, including differences in perspective within those groups,
were considered and taken into account in its design and procedures.352
One step that a normative framework for transitional justice could
take is enabling the recognition that actors on all sides of the conflict
may have performed immoral deeds. This would of course require look-
ing beyond the narrow facts admissible in, and the two-party focus of,
international criminal law, but such a move might significantly increase
the legitimacy of the implementing institutions. So, for example, if the
normative framework addressing the war in the former Yugoslavia had
enabled the relevant transitional justice mechanism to investigate the
NATO bombings of Serbia in 1999, the ultimate findings might have had
more resonance with local populations; at worst, these findings would
have been harder to dismiss.
Finally, transitional justice mechanisms could improve the legiti-
macy of the substance of the norms they present by offering realistic
goals to the populations they seek to serve. Societal recovery from mass
349. Social psychology studies have found a preference for participatory processes that
allow individuals to state their views to an authority who then considers those views. Tyler,
Procedural Justice, supra note 31, at 300.
350. See Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 9-10. See also Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdot-
tir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 380-82 (2003) (noting that, in the con-
text of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, procedural fairness in compensation
for harm includes four elements: voice or participation, neutrality, trustworthiness of authori-
ties, and treatment with dignity and respect).
351. Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 16-19 (using the example of the ICTY to illustrate
the importance of understanding that "the context is always a part of the dispute itself," and
explaining the need for the West to accept assessment of its own responsibility for the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia if the ICTY is to be more than show trials). Teitel describes truth
commissions in El Salvador and South Africa as presenting the role of both sides to the con-
flict in perpetrating human rights abuses. TEITEL, supra note 1, at 86.
352. See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 350, at 382-84.
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violence is an extremely difficult process that may take generations to
complete.' Institutions that seek to assist in this process should be clear
that they offer only that-assistance in creating the conditions for future
reconciliation-and not a magic bullet that will immediately erase com-
plex and long-standing societal dysfunctions.'- Raising expectations
beyond this point will serve only to diminish the legitimacy of transi-
tional justice mechanisms, rendering them even less effective. Moreover,
participation by local actors and incorporation of local cultural values
may not always be sufficient, as transitional justice mechanisms may
still be misunderstood by local populations. Where this is the case, edu-
cational campaigns designed to clear up such misunderstandings may be
used to enhance legitimacy or to create support for decisions or out-
355comes.
These principles-affirming morals, providing a participatory and
inclusive process, and presenting realistic goals-suggest concrete struc-
tural guidelines for transitional justice institutions. They favor the
adoption of accountability mechanisms tailored to the local population in
order to increase legitimacy.
B. Methods
In order to further the first two principles-affirming community
norms and offering an inclusive design process-transitional justice
mechanisms must improve their capacity to recognize and support local
moral authority. Simply discerning relevant norms and the interests of
the different stakeholders is no small task, and requires a multipronged
strategy to optimize the chances of success. This Article suggests three
approaches to discern local preferences in the process of transitional jus-
tice mechanism design: empirical studies of the perceptions of local
populations, surveys of local moral traditions, and participation of local
moral leaders.
Transitional justice mechanism design should begin with what dis-
pute system design scholar Robert Bordone calls a "stakeholder
assessment" in the form of empirical studies of the preferences of local
353. See Brooks, supra note 60, at 2338-39 (suggesting that those attempting to alter
norms "recognize that true cultural change is generally incremental"). See also Gourevitch,
supra note 305, at 42-44 (describing gacaca as extremely difficult for both victims and perpe-
trators, and noting slight improvement in the mood of the country); SESAY, supra note 277, at
14-15 (noting that official statements from political figures in Sierra Leone contributed to
expectations that the TRC would perform "almost 'magical' functions").
354. See Rajeev Bhargava, Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies, in TRUTH V. JUS-
TICE 45, 45 (Robert 1. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
355. Tyler & Darley, supra note 19, at 726, 729.
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populations with regard to accountability.16 These studies might take the
form of qualitative interviews, ethnographies, focus groups, or popula-
tion-based surveys.' Empirical studies of population preferences should
be conducted at least three times during the lifetime of a given transi-
tional justice effort-once during the design phase, once during the
functioning phase, and once after the mechanism has completed its
work.5 8 The initial survey is perhaps the most important, as it enables the
incorporation of local populations' preferences into the transitional jus-
tice mechanism design. When creating hybrid courts, the United Nations
has consistently sent teams to investigate legal violations and plan the
creation of these bodies." 9 In the future, these efforts should include a
scientific study of the preferences of local populations. The East Timor
CRP provides an example of the benefits of such an approach.6 It is also
important to confirm through data, during the lifespan of the transitional
356. See Bordone, supra note 43, at 8. See also Brooks, supra note 60, at 2328-29 (sug-
gesting that it "will involve serious empirical work" to find how norms can be changed
effectively and how conditions can be created to ensure that law matters); Drumbl, Criminol-
ogy, supra note 16, at 278-79 (noting that ignoring the need for empirical work, such as
systematic research on societies in conflict, could further the disconnect between societies and
international criminal justice); Stover & Weinstein, supra note 339, at 325-26 ("[T]o work
effectively (and democratically), social reconstruction must be informed, where appropriate,
by population-based data that reflects the opinions, attitudes, and needs of all sectors of a
society."); Thoms et al., supra note 2, at 56 (linking population-based surveys to ethical re-
quirements of informed consent, noting that it will be the local populations paying the price if
the transitional justice effort goes awry).
357. Thorns et al., supra note 2, at 56.
358. See Phuong Pham & Patrick Vinck, Empirical Research and the Development and
Assessment of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 1 INT'L. J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 231, 236
(2007). See also Bordone, supra note 43, at 8.
359. For example, in Cambodia, a United Nations Group of Experts evaluated existing
evidence to determine the nature of crimes committed, the feasibility of apprehending perpe-
trators, and the legal options for justice before a national or international tribunal. U.N.
Secretary General, Identical Letters dated 15 Mar. 15, 1999 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Docs. A/53/850, S/1999/231, at 1-2 (Mar. 16, 1999). In Timor-Leste, the United Nations
"established an international commission of inquiry in order to gather and compile systemati-
cally information on possible violations of human rights and acts which might constitute
breaches of international humanitarian law committed in East Timor since January 1999."
U.N. Secretary-General, Identical Letters dated Jan. 31, 2000 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council and
the Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Docs. S/2000/59, A/54fl26, at 1
(Jan. 31, 2000). Three Special Rapporteurs were also sent on a joint mission to East Timor to
investigate legal violations. Special Rapporteurs of the Commission on Human Rights, Situa-
tion of Human Rights in East Timor, U.N. Doc. A/54/660 (Dec. 10, 1999). In Sierra Leone, the
United Nations sent a planning commission to meet with government, NGOs, and other
groups, to arrange for the creation of the Special Court, including its premises, structure, func-
tion, staffing, and relationship with the TRC. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 6,
2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2002/246 (Mar. 8, 2002).
360. See supra notes 312-314 and accompanying text.
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justice mechanism, that it has appropriately translated the population's
preferences into its design. Finally, an evidence-based study conducted
after the institution has completed its work will provide feedback on
structures and processes, which can be useful to future transitional jus-
tice efforts.
Of course, as the case studies illustrate, population surveys are no
panacea. They must be designed not only with appropriate scientific
methodology, but with a deep understanding of local culture; these
tasks are not easily completed separately, let alone in tandem. Without
the former, results may not be reliable or representative. Without (and
even sometimes with!) the latter, surveyors may draw erroneous con-
clusions because they do not understand the responses in their cultural
context or because those surveyed do not understand the questions
fully. Survey returns, such as those described in the Cambodia case
study above, might indicate conflicting responses and fail to convey the
complexities of opinions held by respondents. Such surveys must be
accompanied by additional strategies for locating the preferences of
local populations to ensure their reliability. 6'
While population surveys are a good starting point in exploring lo-
cal preferences, deep cultural knowledge is vitally important in
designing accountability mechanisms.3 62 "Without understanding the
cultural values held by subordinates, it is not possible to understand the
basis on which authorities can function effectively." 63 Particularly, if
population surveys reveal a preference for the incorporation of local
traditions and customary law, careful and thorough research should
explore domestic and indigenous norms and laws that might be used to
address mass violence.36 Although such traditions may not map pre-
cisely onto contemporary problems, as a society may not have
addressed such grave crimes in its past, it is likely that they offer prin-
ciples and/or practices that can be drawn into a transitional justice
mechanism.'65 Moreover, a full understanding of the cultural context
361. See Thorns et al., supra note 2, at 62 ("To avoid simplistic or mistaken conclusions,
surveys should always be supplemented with other research methods, including interviews and
focus groups with key stakeholders and special interest groups.").
362. See id.; Brooks, supra note 60, at 2334-36 ("Would-be norm entrepreneurs need to
take seriously myths and stories, customs and rituals, habits and assumptions, and patterns of
interaction."); Tyler et al., supra note 347, at 1154 ("It cannot be assumed that a single form of
legal authority will be equally desirable or effective within all societies. Instead, it is important
to take into consideration the cultural values of the population.").
363. Tyler et al., supra note 347, at 1153 (concluding the basis for subordinates' evalua-
tion of authorities "differs depending on subordinates' social value orientations").
364. See Brooks, supra note 60, at 2335-37.
365. See Harris, supra note 206, at 85-87. For example, Harris suggests that a "formal
truth act ... witnessed by persons of proven merit and genuine saintliness, such as senior
members of the [Theravdda Buddhist] ecclesiastical hierarchy, and presided over by the king,
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can also uncover aspects of accountability efforts that may conflict
with local norms.3 " Of course, this is a task that must be undertaken
with some care, as local traditions may reinforce patterns of domina-
tion within a society.6' As discussed above, this does not mean that
local traditions and customary law should be rejected out of hand; like
all norms, these are subject to different interpretations as well as dy-
namic change. Instead, effort should be made to include as many
perspectives as possible in defining these traditions and laws, with spe-
cial protection of the viewpoints of those most vulnerable to
domination.
Where appropriate, traditional leaders who hold moral authority
should be included in the process of crafting a transitional justice me-
chanism for their nation. Again, the selection and inclusion of these
authorities should depend on the preferences of local populations. In
societies recovering from mass violence, the judicial system may be
viewed as politicized and/or corrupt, and moral authority may reside
elsewhere.36' Rather than assuming that the court system holds the same
moral authority that it does in many Western nations,6  those responsi-
ble for designing transitional justice mechanisms should seek local
input concerning the legitimacy of courts and alternative sources of
moral authority. Again, in selecting moral authorities, concerns of
domination should be aired, and efforts should be made to include
sources of moral authority that might be excluded if traditional struc-
tures of dominance are replicated.
The incorporation of local perspectives through population sur-
veys, studies of traditions, and participation of moral authorities should
increase the legitimacy of the source from, and process through, which
transitional justice mechanisms are created. This cultural knowledge
will also be useful in crafting outreach campaigns, thus increasing the
could be a symbolically potent focus for national reconciliation." Id. at 86-87. See also Te-
rence S. Coonan, Rescuing History: Legal and Theological Reflections on the Task of Making
Former Torturers Accountable, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 512, 543-48 (1996) (assessing post-
torture regimes in Latin America from the perspective of the Catholic notion of sacramentality,
which would prioritize making the truth fully known).
366. Shaw, Memory Frictions, supra note 282, at 195 (demonstrating how the truth tell-
ing celebrated by Sierra Leone's TRC may have been inappropriate in Sierra Leonean society
where survivors preferred to "forget" rather than verbally recall violent events).
367. Heller, supra note 338, at 988. See MANI, supra note 1, at 81.
368. PHAM ET AL., NEVER FORGET, supra note 195, at 33-34 (noting that Cambodian
interviewees viewed the court system as corrupt and often referred problems to moral authori-
ties outside the justice system); Burgess, supra note 310, at 189 (noting that the Timorese
viewed the court system as corrupt and politicized, and looked to traditional leaders for jus-
tice).
369. Koller, supra note 12, at 1041-43.
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legitimacy of the substance of the norms promulgated by transitional
justice mechanisms. In graphical form,
Incorporate local perspectives and moral authorities
I
Legitimacy of transitional justice mechanism
I
Internalization of norms promulgated by mechanism
Reconstruction of social norms opposed to mass violence
Hand in hand with this increased legitimacy come concerns about
domination, corruption, and capacity. Efforts to minimize domination,
no matter how carefully theorized, are likely to face significant hurdles
in their implementation. Decisions as to which perspectives to prioritize
and protect are likely to be highly contested, no matter how thoughtfully
they are made. Even the fundamental choice to combat domination could
be rejected as a cultural imposition.o Corruption and lack of capacity
are also serious concerns with allowing local control of transitional jus-
tice mechanisms. In the wake of mass violence, there may be very few
trustworthy leaders left in the afflicted society, not to mention the soci-
ety's physical infrastructure, which may have been completely
destroyed. In such situations, those who come forward seeking to work
on transitional justice projects may have financial motives or seek re-
venge against perpetrators of the violence. These concerns suggest that
an important role remains for international law in supporting and guiding
transitional justice mechanisms to ensure procedural fairness.
V. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS A PLURALIST PROCESS
This new approach to transitional justice presents a challenge to tra-
ditional visions of international law. It redefines international as pluralist
(rather than universalist) and law as process (rather than substance).
Both of these moves make transitional justice more effective. Universal-
ism assumes that one size fits all; pluralism recognizes and responds to
different normative visions of justice. A process-based approach to dis-
pute resolution is required to implement this framework. Rather than
370. Urs, Accountability, supra note 201, at 66 (explaining that the Western principle of
equality does not necessarily resonate in Cambodian culture).
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assuming that there is one transcendental legal standard and one pre-
ferred legal mechanism for performing transitional justice, we must start
with an inclusive process that asks what form accountability should take
in order to increase legitimacy within a particular society. By shifting the
frame we use to define international and broadening the boundaries of
what we mean by law, we can design more effective international legal
institutions and a more effective system of international law.
The failures of contemporary transitional justice described above
highlight the problems with a universalist approach to international
law."' Legal rules and institutions imposed in the ostensible pursuit of
uniformity that do not incorporate or respond to competing normative
preferences cannot succeed in their quest. In other words, rather than
attempting "universalist harmonization" to "eliminate hybridity alto-
gether by imagining that disputes can and should be made susceptible to
a single governing normative authority," we should develop "procedural
mechanisms, institutions, and practices" that aim to reconcile competing
372norms by creating space for plural voices. Exactly because agreement
on substantive norms is so difficult, this pluralist approach is norma-
tively and practically preferable to universalism because it allows the
expression of less powerful voices, preserves innovation arising from
diverse local settings, and acts as a model for daily life in its mediation
of diversity."' Moreover, it is simply not realistic to imagine that the ca-
cophony of extant perspectives will ever harmonize; so many different
viewpoints will be unified only extremely slowly, if at all.374 Of course, a
pluralist approach is unlikely to fully satisfy any actor, and more likely
to offer messy than tidy solutions.3 7 ' However, it also offers the hope of
inculcating tolerant ideals and, in the case of transitional justice, reviving
local social norms that encourage tolerance. A pluralist approach to tran-
sitional justice and to international law more generally is likely to
increase perceptions of legitimacy by as many actors as possible, thus
increasing the likelihood that it will actually be internalized and effec-
tively shift norms.
How do we attain this pluralist ideal in practice? This Article posits
that international law, and transitional justice in particular, should take
an expansive view of law-a view that is amply supported in domestic
law. Like procedural rules in our domestic legal system, international
law should set the process to be used in crafting transitional justice
371. See supra Part U.B.
372. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 8, at 1159, 1164-66.
373. Id. at 1190-91. For a detailed intellectual history of the field of global legal plural-
ism, see Berman, New Legal Pluralism, supra note 5, at 225.
374. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 8, at 1165, 1191.
375. Id. at 1235-37.
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mechanisms rather than mandating their form or content."' This ap-
proach could prioritize flexibility over predictability in substance in
order to resolve disputes effectively across dramatically different cultural
contexts. Instead of offering a preset menu of options to every society
seeking to recover from mass violence, international law could prescribe
a process of mechanism creation that includes surveys of local popula-
tions, reliance on domestic moral traditions, and participation of moral
leaders.7
Recognizing that flexibility in institutional form may be important,
international law could borrow from theories of alternative dispute reso-
lution, which aim to provide higher quality justice through specific
processes that offer "more tailor-made solutions" to conflicts. 
78 The al-
ternative dispute resolution approach begins with "process pluralism,"
the idea that "one size does not fit all" and that different conflicts must
379
be approached in different ways. It aims to increase "participation in
decision-making by the parties most affected by those decisions."
38 0 Al-
ternative dispute resolution recognizes that there may be more than two
such parties and that disputes often involve several sides whose interests
should be taken into account in crafting a sustainable outcome."' More-
over, parties can select "different procedural rules," "different rules of
decision," and "different and morally differentiated modes of appeal,
argument, and justification" to "deal with different kinds of conflicts."
382
Alternative dispute resolution also looks for ways to increase available
resources or to find common ground, before coming to a final decision."
Just as alternative dispute resolution does not aim to end adjudication but
instead to ask when we should use adjudication as opposed to a different
form of dispute resolution,'3 a locally grounded transitional justice ap-
proach does not seek to eliminate international criminal trials but to
place them within a toolkit of different options that may or may not be
appropriate for specific societies responding to mass violence.
376. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and
Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J.
Disp. RESOL. 319, 341 (2003) ("[T]houghtless transposition of different processes to different
cultures is not good, either for the processes themselves or the people affected by them.").
377. See Berman, A Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323.
378. Menkel-Meadow, Introduction, supra note 9, at 1616.
379. Id. at 1619; Menkel-Meadow, Consensus-Building, supra note 9, at 42.
380. Khalil Z. Shariff, Designing Institutions to Manage Conflict: Principles for the
Problem Solving Organization, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 133, 143-45 (2003); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Deliberative Democracy and Conflict Resolution, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2006,
at 18.
381. Menkel-Meadow, Consensus-Building, supra note 9, at 40.
382. Id. at 44 .
383. See Menkel-Meadow, Introduction, supra note 9, at 1619.
384. Id. at 1623.
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What would a pluralist process approach to transitional justice look
like in practice? The first answer has to be that, without extensive and
rigorous empirical and cultural research, we cannot determine the exact
form that transitional justice will take. This response may not provide
comfort or even satisfaction to those engaged in transitional justice pro-
jects, but past failures have taught us that complex and varied cultures
cannot be distilled into one normative frame. With that important caveat
firmly in mind, we can begin to sketch out how a pluralist process ap-
proach might interact with existing transitional justice mechanisms, and
think about how some of the case studies described above might have
come out differently under a pluralist process approach.
One avenue to creating a pluralist process would seek to adapt cur-
rent institutional structures. For example, the Office of the Prosecutor at
the ICC might undertake empirical surveys of local preferences and en-
gage scholars with a deep knowledge of local cultures, as well as local
moral authorities, in its initial investigation of a potential case. Under
this model, the prosecutor would issue an indictment only if the popula-
tion expresses a preference for international prosecutions in a distant
location; otherwise, the court might support other approaches, ranging
from locally grounded accountability processes to national prosecu-
tions."' While there is some appeal in retaining current structures, there
are numerous problems with this "prosecutorial discretion" approach.8
Apart from the obvious conflict of interest given the prosecutor's man-
date to try cases, the ICC was not designed to consider and assess
alternative transitional justice approaches. As a result, it is not likely to
offer the most effective route to a pluralist process.
Alternatively, the United Nations might create a new body responsi-
ble for formulating transitional justice processes. While this path might
be more difficult to navigate politically and practically than an adapta-
tion of the ICC, a body designed specifically to craft transitional justice
mechanisms is significantly more likely to be successful in the long run.
Relying on the principles laid out above, this new body would undertake
thorough and rigorous empirical and cultural research before determin-
ing the form of transitional justice mechanism appropriate for a given
post-conflict society. Institutional expenses might be defrayed through
reliance on academic and nonprofit organizations willing to design and
385. Several scholars have suggested that the ICC's future may lie in playing a suppor-
tive role with respect to domestic prosecutions. See, e.g., Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 101,
at 81; Burke-White, Community of Courts, supra note 100, at 13; Turner, Criminal Law, supra
note 101, at 5-6.
386. For further discussion of the potential implications of such an approach, see Green-
awalt, supra note 261, at 125-32; Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties,
Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481 (2003).
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implement empirical surveys and cultural studies. Such a body could
also perform the important function of collecting institutional knowledge
of transitional justice mechanisms. While maintaining awareness that
each situation of mass violence is different, the body could draw lessons
from past mistakes and successes."' Most importantly, apart from en-
forcing the baseline principle of preventing domination, this body would
not dictate the form or content of transitional justice mechanisms but
instead draw on its knowledge of the afflicted society to design bespoke
institutions.
As explained above, it is impossible to determine, without knowl-
edge of local population preferences and a deep understanding of local
cultures, which transitional mechanisms might be appropriate in differ-
ent situations. However, this framework can help us think about how
some of the case studies described above might have come out differ-
ently under a pluralist process approach. In East Timor, the population's
preference to see trials for those most responsible might have pointed to
ICC prosecution of higher-level officials, given the lack of political will
to try Indonesian officials before the Serious Crimes Panels.388 The sen-
tences for these officials might have included public apologies or
reparations to locate missing persons. At the same time, the successes of
the CRPs suggest that these approaches might have been pursued simul-
taneously. In any case, a more inclusive design process might have
ensured a victim-directed reconciliation process. In Cambodia, similarly,
the hybrid tribunal might have incorporated local moral authority, such
as Buddhist principles, into its design. Perhaps this would have led to a
mechanism more akin to mediation than litigation, or to simplified and
more accessible structures and proceedings. Sentencing might have in-
cluded public confession and apology. It is also possible that a pluralist
process approach would have pointed to transitional justice mechanisms
entirely outside the current menu of options.
CONCLUSION
There is no easy transitional justice solution; an effective approach
requires an inclusive and carefully structured design process. We might
call this process "law" and this inclusiveness "international," suggesting
a new way forward not only for transitional justice but also for interna-
tional law more generally.389 Prescriptive empiricism can be used to
387. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and Transi-
tional Justice, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 289, 304-06 (2009).
388. See supra notes 147, 333 and accompanying text.
389. See Berman, A Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323-24.
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design international institutions in many fields, increasing their effec-
tiveness in achieving their goals. This Article has argued that the goal of
transitional justice, previously poorly conceptualized and undertheo-
rized, should be to reconstruct social norms relating to mass violence. In
order to be most effective at altering human behavior, the norms pre-
sented by transitional justice institutions must be internalized by local
populations. This internalization requires that an affected society view
the relevant accountability mechanism as legitimate. To attain this
legitimacy, transitional justice mechanisms must be carefully tailored to
meet the needs of particular societies recovering from mass violence.
Much like democracy, a pluralist process will be messy and complex, but
in return offers the promise of effectiveness-a bargain well worth the
cost.
